INTRODUCTION TO

CULTURAL STUDIES

(Semester 4)

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# Introduction to Cultural Studies

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INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL STUDIES

COURSE DESCRIPTION

Cultural Studies is an interdisciplinary area of research and teaching that brings in new perspectives to the study of culture and society. It is meant to grapple mainly with the processes through which human society and the unlimited diverse groups within it come to terms with their everyday life, community life, everyday politics (strikes, demonstrations...) or what anthropologists call, “low culture.” But Cultural Studies, as a discipline, extends its reach to include also popular culture like TV shows, radio, advertising, popular music and dance, primitive forms of art, education and educational systems, etc.

This course aims at acquainting students with the environment that surrounds them and which is no longer limited to their immediate one but has crossed all the imaginable frontiers, physical and intellectual, due to a key factor: globalization. Indeed, our interactions are no more necessarily limited to our district, village, city or even country, but we have become “citizens” of the world, where virtually anything happening somewhere in the world is known instantly and could have tremendous repercussions on world politics and economy, provided someone happening to have a cellular phone was around, and if not, there is “big brother,” cameras everywhere, or even “god’s eye”, satellites that scan our actions 24/7 (the assassination of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 is a case in point...)

21st century has witnessed a pace of change never witnessed before due to many factors among which globalization remains key. It is said that humanity’s technical and scientific progress and achievements have gone crescendo, but since the mid 20th century, this progress has grown exponentially, a progress manifested mainly in the huge acquired power of computers to calculate, and the unlimited possibilities digitalization has opened for humanity, making the world in the process open to widespread speculation.

Indeed, due to the huge strides taken by ICT (information and communication technologies), as well as the recent extraordinary technological achievements in the domains of transportation, medicine, artificial intelligence, etc, globalization has grown in ways never witnessed before reducing the world to the size of a “village”. As a consequence, time and space have shrunk making what needed months to be reached or achieved a century ago reduced to minutes. Some “Illuminato” like the new South African technologies tycoon Elon Musk, intends to launch even commercial interplanetary trips around 2025...

THE NEED FOR CULTURAL STUDIES

The need for Cultural Studies has become a must because we can no longer afford to live in insular environments due to the hyper interconnected world that globalization has created. Any attempt at closing borders results automatically in economic downturns and even sanctions. In fact, and
this is more of an irony, some countries’ obsession, especially the ones known as “rogue states,” is precisely how to avoid limited access to world market. What’s more, they are often ready to do huge sacrifices at the expense, sometimes, of their own sovereignty.

The need for Cultural Studies lies in the fact that a lot of people around the world, Moroccans included, are no more masters of their own destiny. People have become dependent on external factors which sometimes question their sense of identity, their morals, their way of living, and worse, their existence. Indeed, suffice it to be, for example, a Muslim nowadays and in certain areas to see your existence in jeopardy (Rohingas in Myanmar, as well as other Muslim minorities in China, India, to talk just about the extreme cases)

Cultural Studies are there as a form of consciousness/awareness shield against the globalizing forces of greed and profit, as well as a protection (or at least a limitation) against the dehumanization, objectification, and alienation that seem to accompany the inexorable trends of globalization. Cultural Studies constitute in fact a move away from elites and their practices toward the practices of the subaltern, a word which literally means subordinate, a low rank in the army. An important characteristic of the work by the proponents of Subaltern Studies is their focus on ‘cultural’ aspects in order to understand historical events, including uprisings and rebellions.

In other words, Cultural Studies as a discipline proposes a paradigm shift in our perspectives and our dealings with all that has preceded, especially the part dealing with history (told chiefly from the point of view of the powerful/colonizer), and instead Cultural Studies propose to revisit and start looking and studying the ways in which ordinary people—peasants, factory workers, common people—make history.¹

¹ For further reading see: http://cscs.res.in/courses_folder/undergraduate-courses/papers.2008-02-05.9798782311/general-introduction
Multilingualism, Cultural Identity, and Education in Morocco

By Moha Ennaji

Morocco is characterised by language and culture complexity. The language situation is full of paradoxes and contrasts in the sense that nothing is what it seems to be. There are many paradoxes at the levels of language attitudes and language policy. Moroccan society has had a long tradition of multilingualism and multiculturalism, which have become more prominent since the beginning of the twentieth century, as a consequence of colonization and international processes, notably globalisation. Multilingualism is a major characteristic of Morocco, and for many Moroccans language loyalty constitutes a core value of their ethnocultural identity...

The Moroccan Cultural Context

The relationship between multiculturalism and multilingualism is a strong one. The process of readjustment to a second or a third culture entails the use of new knowledge, rules of communication, and inferential strategies. It is generally coupled with the learning of new languages, in which case multiculturalism implies multilingualism. Acculturation may result when one cultural model is imposed on another through some kind of assimilation, particularly when the dominant culture, which often has a strong influence on the subordinate one, manages to introduce transformations into the subordinate social structure.

The Moroccan cultural context is characterized by two main kinds of discourse. The first one is traditional and conservative in nature and the second is modernist and progressive. According to the first trend, modern culture should be discarded simply because it disseminates Western values and thought. The modernists think, on the opposite, that it is the traditional ideas that perpetuate 'backward' and 'irrational' thinking in the country. In the 1960s and the 1970s, there was a tentative consensus or balance between the two trends, but with the recent increase of Muslim fundamentalism and the revival of local cultures and search for ethnic identity, there tends to be a conflict between the two tendencies.

Moroccan society is socially and linguistically diverse, and its cultural makeup is one of the richest in the Maghreb. Different speech communities in Morocco attempt, in different ways, to resist Westernisation by raising their cultural, ethnic, and linguistic awareness. To achieve this, the use of language is paramount; it is well known that language loyalty and maintenance are possible when favourable conditions prevail, namely, ethnic consciousness, size of the community, intra-group communication, and a common religion. The fact that Arabic and Islam are closely related favours the revival of Muslim values and cultural identity.

Being fervently nationalistic, Moroccan political parties, pressure groups, and cultural associations have been eager to maintain and revitalize their linguistic and cultural heritage. Their incessant efforts are geared towards linguistic and cultural awareness, which reflects their eagerness to maintain cultural identity. For instance, Standard Arabic has been revived through the Arabisation

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process, which has led to the strengthening of the Muslim faith and to the revival of Islamic convictions. In addition, Berber cultural associations, on their part, have increased in number; their objective is to revitalise the Berber language through its recognition as an official language and through its standardisation and introduction in schools.

The revitalisation of this cultural legacy depends greatly on the extent to which Standard Arabic, Moroccan Arabic, and Berber are successful in fulfilling all the functions associated with them as symbols of cultural authenticity and ethnolinguistic harmony that mirror a rich linguistic and cultural tradition. This success in turn depends on the number of sociolinguistic domains in which Standard Arabic, Moroccan Arabic, and Berber are used.

These languages do not fulfil all the linguistic functions, since each one covers only a limited number of domains. For instance, Moroccan Arabic and Berber cover the domains of home and street, while Standard Arabic is used in education, public administration, and the media. French is utilised to complement the picture, as it has functions and domains which overlap with those of Standard Arabic, in addition to covering the private sector, science, and technology.

Thus, the sociolinguistic context in Morocco is bound to be characterised by both sociocultural plurality and language tension or conflict. This tension varies in degree and intensity along the scale of tolerance and dialogue between cultures. Given its geographical position, Morocco has historically always been open to other civilisations, and Moroccans have largely been able to embrace other cultures while preserving their identity.

Although Morocco is a multilingual society, it should be pointed out that not all Moroccans are multilingual. There are important differences among individuals as concerns their mastery of languages and their ability to speak or write more than one language. In fact, there are individual differences in language proficiency: the range is from monolingual Moroccan Arabic or Berber speakers to those who can use written Arabic as well as one or two foreign languages for special purposes or for everyday conversation.
This question is rhetorical when looking at the globe: the kingdom is situated at the peak of the continent, and it sprawls itself along the top of the Sahara desert all the way down to sub-Saharan Africa. It is disconnected from Europe by a small channel, which — although barely 14 kilometers [9 miles] wide — serves as a constant physical reminder of both its proximity to and its remoteness from the economic and cultural fortress that is the European Union.

Speaking of “Africanness” is far more imposing when studying Morocco’s natural linguistic space. The majority of its inhabitants are Amazigh-speaking; it shares a common language with 20 million Berber speakers spread across five million square kilometers [about 2 million square miles] of land from Egypt to the Canary Islands and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Niger river. They all live in the same continent. They’re all Africans — whether they are Soussis, Rifains, Kabyles, Tunisians, Libyans, Egyptians or the Tauregs of Niger and Mali.

Geography and language, however, have reasons that ideology ignores. If Morocco continues to deny its connection to Africa, it is because it has been silent for a long time about its Amazigh heritage. This denial of its identity dates back to the 1930s, when nationalists decreed that Moroccans were of Arab origin and descended from the “thigh of Jupiter,” the conqueror who came in from the heart of the Arab desert to bring the word of God.

This ukase aimed at rejecting Morocco’s Amazigh heritage resulted in collateral damage: the disappearance of a country that was, first and foremost, African. “Our teaching manual emphasizes our Eastern past and our connection to the Arab peninsula, to the detriment of Africa. Some continue to defend the Pan-Arab theory that places the origin of the Amazighs in Yemen and Syria, refusing at the same time to recognize the African heritage of the populations who have called Morocco home for millennia,” explains the researcher Ahmed Assid.

The challenge

With one swipe, we have erased the period from prehistory up until the arrival of Islam in Morocco. “Archeology shows us that the origins of Amazigh society are not oriental. They are African. Here we’re talking about a period going back as far as 200,000 years. Amazigh is undoubtedly an African language. It is also valid to argue that the Tifinagh script shares a common origin with other written scripts from Africa. The official historcial account supports the notion that the Amazigh alphabet is of Phoenician origin in order to give it the appearance of originating in the Orient,” explains Assid. …
Amazigh and then African

... Hassan II, …according to his famous formula, wanted to admit that “Morocco resembles a tree whose roots plunge deeply into the earth of Africa and which breathes thanks to its foliage, which benefits from the winds of Europe.” Amazigh culture, however, remains the only bad weed to pull up from the garden that is Morocco. He snuffs out the identity debate, supporting some and cracking down on other participants at the conference. The idea is still the same. In 1998, benefiting from the crumbling lead weight established by Hassan II on this question of identity, the cabinet chief of the crown prince, Hassan Aourid, reaffirmed his Amazigh identity by emphasizing the country’s African character. “Should we just forget about the Great Masinissa [an Amazigh king who fought against the Romans in North Africa] who was the first to serve Africa for Africans?” he asked in a chronicle published in *Le Journal* and addressed to the minister of human rights at the time.

To each their own continent

After a long and tumultuous struggle, the Amazigh have finally been recognized. In their latest victory, the 2011 constitution recognized Amazigh as an official language. African identity, however, has received precious little recognition. Fundamental law expresses this reluctantly. “The constitution of 2011 does away with our African composition under the vague and watered down term of ‘affluent Africans,’” Assid points out. This excludes many from the melting pot of Morocco. “The people of southern Morocco define themselves as African because they have always looked toward those in Sub-Saharan Africa, with whom they have shared commercial ties since the Middle Ages. …

Today, however, this lively praise in the south has fallen on deaf ears in the north. In the study “Daily Islam: a survey of religious values and practices in Morocco,” Moroccans are defined first as Muslims, then as Arabs and only then as Moroccan and Berber. The African component to their identity comes last for more than half of those surveyed. A little less than a quarter of them put it in fourth place. Being African comes in third place for less than 3%.

Living with “the other”

“Africa has become a synonym for poverty and violence for many Moroccans who wish to dissociate themselves from these negative images. This affects the relationships they have with African migrants,” explains sociologist Fatima Ait Ben Lmadani, who studies Moroccan perceptions of Sub-Saharan immigrants.

The trend is on the rise. In 2008, the Moroccan Association of Migrant Studies and Research (AMERM) published a study that concluded that 40% of those surveyed did not relate to Sub-Saharan peoples as their neighbors. Moreover, 70% would refuse to share housing with someone from Sub-Saharan Africa and 60% would not marry someone from this region. Many of the researchers admit they are not surprised by these figures. It represents the refusal to be confused with a “poor African,” added to the dominant-dominated relationship that “pervades our imagination,” explains historian Maati Monjib. Its origins are deeply rooted in history: slavery, armed conquest, pillaging — a bloody trio that represents the darker side of their shared past. The examples are many: in the 16th century, Ahmed El Mansour touched the mineral riches of the Songhai empire (from West Africa). In the 17th century, the Alawite Sultan Moulay Ismail carried out campaigns to capture black Africans as slaves. Arab and Amazigh tribes were, at the time, a vital link in the slave trade. “Arab and Berber superiority as conquerors of Sub-Saharan slaves is anchored in the collective subconscious of Morocco,” explains Monjib.
“...[T]he European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient, and to a certain extent the same is true of the methods of contemporary learned Orientalists, whose subject is not so much the East itself as the East made known, and therefore less fearsome, to the Western reading public.” ‘Orientalism, by Edward Said. p. 60)

Luscious beautiful maids half naked bathing in a Turkish bath, or dancing to the drums of some black eunuch; carpet vendors, snake charmers playing the flute; fat ugly turbaned sultans indulging in promiscuous games in their harems, or laying in their lavish palaces with buffets overflowing with unimagined foods and drinks… Well, you’ve probably seen these “orientalist” pictures somewhere, and you may even have one or two at home exhibited in your salons, and I bet it happens that you stare sometimes at one of these paintings marveling at their beauty or reminiscing about the good old times they portray…

Have you ever asked yourself where these images come from? Who painted them, with what goal? And as an Arab or Oriental living in an oriental land, what chance you could attend or live such scenes?

The legitimacy of such questions lies in the fact that for us Moroccans, with the exception of snake charmers or carpet vendors in “Jamae Lafna” in Marrakech, you would probably never have the chance to attend one in a normal setting, unless you are in a hotel for example that takes orientalist décor as one of its assets. In other words, as an oriental yourself, you simply wonder if these portraits refer to areas and times that truly exist, or are they pure inventions of a school of art named “the Orientalist painters.” Put differently, these portraits refer to the East, but which East and whose East?

If the Earth is round, then the very notion of East is questionable. It means there is an entity that is taking itself as a center and defining the rest accordingly. This entity is of course Europe which, since the Renaissance, took its position as the center of the world and defined the lands on its east as oriental lands and conferred, imagined and invented traits and features without ever checking with the natives of these lands the veracity of these portraits/claims…

In other words, and in different circumstances, with the fact that the Earth is round, any focal point horizontally could be the center and could define the rest accordingly, which

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5 Which are there “artificially” as part of the service catered to the swarms of foreign tourists who come precisely to Marrakech looking for these exotic scenes...
comes to say that the whole thing is about who has power, has the privilege of naming and defining the rest. Ironically, if we were to follow the Occidental logic, Morocco would be one of the most occidental lands,⁶ and Australia one of the most oriental ones.

**EDWARD SAID AND ORIENTALISM**

In his ground breaking essay, *Orientalism* published in 1978, the scholar Edward Said, of Palestinian origins, identifies a series of assumptions that the West makes about Orientals. He finds that the West portrays the Orientals for example as irrational, excessive, oppressive and despots when in position of power, sly and servile when in subservient positions. Female orientals are mysterious, submissive, obedient, erotic, easy-going about their morals.

He explores how these assumptions are constructed in opposition to what the Westerners think about themselves: rational, rigorous, hardworking, open-minded, tolerant, and therefore defines this projected image of "Arabs" in the mind of Westerners as the other. He concludes that, as a human feature, we tend to define the other by what we are not.

The danger is that these assumptions come to be treated as truth and therefore impact our relations and our ideologies. Said therefore calls for a new treatment of "the Orient" - allowing for self-representation of authors belonging to the Orient rather than depending on second hand representation, which the West has always done.

Said also objects to half the globe being labelled "the Orient" since you can hardly make generalisations that will apply equally to Moroccans as well as Chinese, for example. Said helps us explore the processes of constructing binary opposites and uncovering the values that cause these opposites to come into being. He calls for an erasure between these boundaries and lines, and for the construction a more moderate way of thinking. He gives some examples of these binary opposites and how they are applied to the West and to "the Orient": civilised / uncivilised, democracy / despotism, developed / undeveloped, liberated / repressed, educated / ignorant.

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⁶ Morocco’s very name in Arabic means the extreme west (Al MAgrib Alaqsa), or the land of the sunset.
I will wait for her in the yard that Maggie and I made so clean and wavy yesterday afternoon. A yard like this is more comfortable than most people know. It is not just a yard. It is like an extended living room. When the hard clay is swept clean as a floor and the fine sand around the edges lined with tiny, irregular grooves, anyone can come and sit and look up into the elm tree and wait for the breezes that never come inside the house.

Maggie will be nervous until after her sister goes: she will stand hopelessly in corners, homely and ashamed of the burn scars down her arms and legs, eying her sister with a mixture of envy and awe. She thinks her sister has held life always in the palm of one hand, that "no" is a word the world never learned to say to her.

You've no doubt seen those TV shows where the child who has "made it" is confronted, as a surprise, by her own mother and father, tottering in weakly from backstage. (A pleasant surprise, of course: What would they do if parent and child came on the show only to curse out and insult each other?) On TV mother and child embrace and smile into each other's faces. Sometimes the mother and father weep, the child wraps them in her arms and leans across the table to tell how she would not have made it without their help. I have seen these programs.

Sometimes I dream a dream in which Dee and I are suddenly brought together on a TV program of this sort. Out of a dark and soft.seated limousine I am ushered into a bright room filled with many people. There I meet a smiling, gray, sporty man like Johnny Carson who shakes my hand and tells me what a fine girl I have. Then we are on the stage and Dee is embracing me with tears in her eyes. She pins on my dress a large orchid, even though she has told me once that she thinks orchids are tacky flowers.

In real life I am a large, big.boned woman with rough, man.working hands. In the winter I wear flannel nightgowns to bed and overalls during the day. I can kill and clean a hog as mercilessly as a man. My fat keeps me hot in zero weather. I can work outside all day, breaking ice to get water for washing; I can eat pork liver cooked over the open fire minutes after it comes steaming from the hog. One winter I knocked a bull calf straight in the brain between the eyes with a sledge hammer and had the meat hung up to chill before nightfall. But of course all this does not show on television. I am the way my daughter would want me to be: a hundred pounds lighter, my skin like an uncooked barley pancake. My hair glistens in the hot bright lights. Johnny Carson has much to do to keep up with my quick and witty tongue.

But that is a mistake. I know even before I wake up. Who ever knew a Johnson with a quick tongue? Who can even imagine me looking a strange white man in the eye? It seems to me I have talked to them always with one foot raised in flight, with my head fumed in whichever way is farthest from them. Dee, though. She would always look anyone in the eye. Hesitation was no part of her nature.

"How do I look, Mama?" Maggie says, showing just enough of her thin body enveloped in pink skirt and red blouse for me to know she's there, almost hidden by the door.

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8 Walker (1944-) is a Pulitzer Prize-winning, African-American novelist and poet, most famous for her novel The Color Purple (1982).
"Come out into the yard," I say.

Have you ever seen a lame animal, perhaps a dog run over by some careless person rich enough to own a car, sidle up to someone who is ignorant enough to be kind to him? That is the way my Maggie walks. She has been like this, chin on chest, eyes on ground, feet in shuffle, ever since the fire that burned the other house to the ground.

Dee is lighter than Maggie, with nicer hair and a fuller figure. She's a woman now, though sometimes I forget. How long ago was it that the other house burned? Ten, twelve years? Sometimes I can still hear the flames and feel Maggie's arms sticking to me, her hair smoking and her dress falling off her in little black papery flakes. Her eyes seemed stretched open, blazed open by the flames reflected in them. And Dee. I see her standing off under the sweet gum tree she used to dig gum out of; a look of concentration on her face as she watched the last dingy gray board of the house fall in toward the red hot brick chimney. Why don't you do a dance around the ashes? I'd wanted to ask her. She had hated the house that much.

I used to think she hated Maggie, too. But that was before we raised money, the church and me, to send her to Augusta to school. She used to read to us without pity; forcing words, lies, other folks' habits, whole lives upon us two, sitting trapped and ignorant underneath her voice. She washed us in a river of make believe, burned us with a lot of knowledge we didn't necessarily need to know. Pressed us to her with the serf ous way she read, to shove us away at just the moment, like dimwits, we seemed about to understand.

Dee wanted nice things. A yellow organdy dress to wear to her graduation from high school; black pumps to match a green suit she'd made from an old suit somebody gave me. She was determined to stare down any disaster in her efforts. Her eyelids would not flicker for minutes at a time. Often I fought off the temptation to shake her. At sixteen she had a style of her own: and knew what style was.

I never had an education myself. After second grade the school was closed down. Don't ask my why: in 1927 colored asked fewer questions than they do now. Sometimes Maggie reads to me. She stumbles along good naturedly but can't see well. She knows she is not bright. Like good looks and money, quickness passes her by. She will marry John Thomas (who has mossy teeth in an earnest face) and then I'll be free to sit here and I guess just sing church songs to myself. Although I never was a good singer. Never could carry a tune. I was always better at a man's job. I used to love to milk till I was hooked in the side in '49. Cows are soothing and slow and don't bother you, unless you try to milk them the wrong way.

I have deliberately turned my back on the house. It is three rooms, just like the one that burned, except the roof is tin; they don't make shingle roofs any more. There are no real windows, just some holes cut in the sides, like the portholes in a ship, but not round and not square, with rawhide holding the shutters up on the outside. This house is in a pasture, too, like the other one. No doubt when Dee sees it she will want to tear it down. She wrote me once that no matter where we "choose" to live, she will manage to come see us. But she will never bring her friends. Maggie and I thought about this and Maggie asked me, "Mama, when did Dee ever have any friends?"

She had a few. Furtive boys in pink shirts hanging about on washday after school. Nervous girls who never laughed. Impressed with her they worshiped the well turned phrase, the cute shape, the scalding humor that erupted like bubbles in Iye. She read to them.
When she was courting Jimmy T she didn't have much time to pay to us, but turned all her faultfinding power on him. He flew to marry a cheap city girl from a family of ignorant flashy people. She hardly had time to recompose herself.

When she comes I will meet—but there they are!

Maggie attempts to make a dash for the house, in her shuffling way, but I stay her with my hand. "Come back here," I say. And she stops and tries to dig a well in the sand with her toe.

It is hard to see them clearly through the strong sun. But even the first glimpse of leg out of the car tells me it is Dee. Her feet were always neat-looking, as if God himself had shaped them with a certain style. From the other side of the car comes a short, stocky man. Hair is all over his head a foot long and hanging from his chin like a kinky mule tail. I hear Maggie suck in her breath. "Uhnnnh," is what it sounds like. Like when you see the wriggling end of a snake just in front of your foot on the road. "Uhnnnh."

Dee next. A dress down to the ground, in this hot weather. A dress so loud it hurts my eyes. There are yellows and oranges enough to throw back the light of the sun. I feel my whole face warming from the heat waves it throws out. Earrings gold, too, and hanging down to her shoulders. Bracelets dangling and making noises when she moves her arm up to shake the folds of the dress out of her armpits. The dress is loose and flows, and as she walks closer, I like it. I hear Maggie go "Uhnnnh" again. It is her sister's hair. It stands straight up like the wool on a sheep. It is black as night and around the edges are two long pigtails that rope about like small lizards disappearing behind her ears.

"Wa.su.zo.Tean.o!" she says, coming on in that gliding way the dress makes her move. The short stocky fellow with the hair to his navel is all grinning and he follows up with "Asalamalakim, my mother and sister!" He moves to hug Maggie but she falls back, right up against the back of my chair. I feel her trembling there and when I look up I see the perspiration falling off her chin.

"Don't get up," says Dee. Since I am stout it takes something of a push. You can see me trying to move a second or two before I make it. She turns, showing white heels through her sandals, and goes back to the car. Out she peeks next with a Polaroid. She stoops down quickly and lines up picture after picture of me sitting there in front of the house with Maggie cowering behind me. She never takes a shot without making sure the house is included. When a cow comes nibbling around the edge of the yard she snaps it and me and Maggie and the house. Then she puts the Polaroid in the back seat of the car, and comes up and kisses me on the forehead.

Meanwhile Asalamalakim is going through motions with Maggie's hand. Maggie's hand is as limp as a fish, and probably as cold, despite the sweat, and she keeps trying to pull it back. It looks like Asalamalakim wants to shake hands but wants to do it fancy. Or maybe he don't know how people shake hands. Anyhow, he soon gives up on Maggie.

"Well," I say. "Dee."

"No, Mama," she says. "Not 'Dee,' Wangero Leewanika Kemanjo!"

"What happened to 'Dee'?" I wanted to know.

"She's dead," Wangero said. "I couldn't bear it any longer, being named after the people who oppress me."
"You know as well as me you was named after your aunt Dicie," I said. Dicie is my sister. She named Dee. We called her "Big Dee" after Dee was born.

"But who was she named after?" asked Wangero.

"I guess after Grandma Dee," I said.

"And who was she named after?" asked Wangero.

"Her mother," I said, and saw Wangero was getting tired. "That's about as far back as I can trace it," I said. Though, in fact, I probably could have carried it back beyond the Civil War through the branches.

"Well," said Asalamalakim, "there you are."

"Uhnmm," I heard Maggie say.

"There I was not," I said, "before 'Dicie' cropped up in our family, so why should I try to trace it that far back?"

He just stood there grinning, looking down on me like somebody inspecting a Model A car. Every once in a while he and Wangero sent eye signals over my head.

"How do you pronounce this name?" I asked.

"You don't have to call me by it if you don't want to," said Wangero.

"Why shouldn't I?" I asked. "If that's what you want us to call you, we'll call you."

"I know it might sound awkward at first," said Wangero.

"I'll get used to it," I said. "Ream it out again."

Well, soon we got the name out of the way. Asalamalakim had a name twice as long and three times as hard. After I tripped over it two or three times he told me to just call him Hakim.a.barber. I wanted to ask him was he a barber, but I didn't really think he was, so I didn't ask.

"You must belong to those beef.cattle peoples down the road," I said. They said "Asalamalakim" when they met you, too, but they didn't shake hands. Always too busy: feeding the cattle, fixing the fences, putting up salt.lick shelters, throwing down hay. When the white folks poisoned some of the herd the men stayed up all night with rifles in their hands. I walked a mile and a half just to see the sight.

Hakim.a.barber said, "I accept some of their doctrines, but farming and raising cattle is not my style." (They didn't tell me, and I didn't ask, whether Wangero (Dee) had really gone and married him.)

We sat down to eat and right away he said he didn't eat collards and pork was unclean. Wangero, though, went on through the chitlins and com bread, the greens and everything else. She talked a blue streak over the sweet potatoes. Everything delighted her. Even the fact that we still used the benches her daddy made for the table when we couldn't effort to buy chairs.
"Oh, Mama!" she cried. Then turned to Hakim.a.barber. "I never knew how lovely these benches are. You can feel the bums prints," she said, running her hands underneath her and along the bench. Then she gave a sigh and her hand closed over Grandma Dee's butter dish. "That's it!" she said. "I knew there was something I wanted to ask you if I could have." She jumped up from the table and went over in the corner where the churn stood, the milk in it crabber by now. She looked at the churn and looked at it.

"This churn top is what I need," she said. "Didn't Uncle Buddy whittle it out of a tree you all used to have?"

"Yes," I said.

"Un huh," she said happily. "And I want the dasher, too."

"Uncle Buddy whittle that, too?" asked the barber.

Dee (Wangero) looked up at me.

"Aunt Dee's first husband whittled the dash," said Maggie so low you almost couldn't hear her. "His name was Henry, but they called him Stash."

"Maggie's brain is like an elephant's," Wangero said, laughing. "I can use the chute top as a centerpiece for the alcove table," she said, sliding a plate over the chute, "and I'll think of something artistic to do with the dasher."

When she finished wrapping the dasher the handle stuck out. I took it for a moment in my hands. You didn't even have to look close to see where hands pushing the dasher up and down to make butter had left a kind of sink in the wood. In fact, there were a lot of small sinks; you could see where thumbs and fingers had sunk into the wood. It was beautiful light yellow wood, from a tree that grew in the yard where Big Dee and Stash had lived.

After dinner Dee (Wangero) went to the trunk at the foot of my bed and started rifling through it. Maggie hung back in the kitchen over the dishpan. Out came Wangero with two quilts. They had been pieced by Grandma Dee and then Big Dee and me had hung them on the quilt frames on the front porch and quilted them. One was in the Lone Stat pattern. The other was Walk Around the Mountain. In both of them were scraps of dresses Grandma Dee had worn fifty and more years ago. Bits and pieces of Grandpa Jalltell's Paisley shirts. And one teeny faded blue piece, about the size of a penny matchbox, that was from Great Grandpa Ezra's uniform that he wore in the Civil War.

"Mama," Wangro said sweet as a bird. "Can I have these old quilts?"

I heard something fall in the kitchen, and a minute later the kitchen door slammed.

"Why don't you take one or two of the others?" I asked. "These old things was just done by me and Big Dee from some tops your grandma pieced before she died."

"No," said Wangero. "I don't want those. They are stitched around the borders by machine."

"That'll make them last better," I said.

"That's not the point," said Wangero. "These are all pieces of dresses Grandma used to wear. She did all this stitching by hand. Imag'ine!" She held the quilts securely in her arms, stroking them.
"Some of the pieces, like those lavender ones, come from old clothes her mother handed down to her," I said, moving up to touch the quilts. Dee (Wangero) moved back just enough so that I couldn't reach the quilts. They already belonged to her.

"Imagine!" she breathed again, clutching them closely to her bosom.

"The truth is," I said, "I promised to give them quilts to Maggie, for when she matties John Thomas."

She gasped like a bee had stung her.

"Maggie can't appreciate these quilts!" she said. "She'd probably be backward enough to put them to everyday use."

"I reckon she would," I said. "God knows I been saving 'em for long enough with nobody using 'em. I hope she will!" I didn't want to bring up how I had offered Dee (Wangero) a quilt when she went away to college. Then she had told they were old-fashioned, out of style.

"But they're priceless!" she was saying now, furiously; for she has a temper. "Maggie would put them on the bed and in five years they'd be in rags. Less than that!"

"She can always make some more," I said. "Maggie knows how to quilt."

Dee (Wangero) looked at me with hatred. "You just will not understand. The point is these quilts, these quilts!"

"Well," I said, stumped. "What would you do with them?"

"Hang them," she said. As if that was the only thing you could do with quilts.

Maggie by now was standing in the door. I could almost hear the sound her feet made as they scraped over each other.

"She can have them, Mama," she said, like somebody used to never winning anything, or having anything reserved for her. "I can 'member Grandma Dee without the quilts."

I looked at her hard. She had filled her bottom lip with checkerberry snuff and gave her face a kind of dopey, hangdog look. It was Grandma Dee and Big Dee who taught her how to quilt herself. She stood there with her scarred hands hidden in the folds of her skirt. She looked at her sister with something like fear but she wasn't mad at her. This was Maggie's portion. This was the way she knew God to work.

When I looked at her like that something hit me in the top of my head and ran down to the soles of my feet. Just like when I'm in church and the spirit of God touches me and I get happy and shout. I did some-thing I never done before: hugged Maggie to me, then dragged her on into the room, snatched the quilts out of Miss Wangero's hands and dumped them into Maggie's lap. Maggie just sat there on my bed with her mouth open.

"Take one or two of the others," I said to Dee.

But she turned without a word and went out to Hakim-a-barber.
"You just don't understand," she said, as Maggie and I came out to the car. 

"What don't I understand?" I wanted to know. 

"Your heritage," she said, and then she turned to Maggie, kissed her, and said, "You ought to try to make something of yourself, too, Maggie. It's really a new day for us. But from the way you and Mama still live you'd never know it."

She put on some sunglasses that hid everything above the tip of her nose and chin.

Maggie smiled; maybe at the sunglasses. But a real smile, not scared. After we watched the car dust settle I asked Maggie to bring me a dip of snuff. And then the two of us sat there just enjoying, until it was time to go in the house and go to bed.

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**PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS:**

THE NARRATOR, a middle-aged black woman, 
MAGGIE, her younger daughter 
DEE, her older daughter 
DEE'S MALE COMPANION

**SETTING OF THE SHORT STORY,**

LOCALE: Rural Georgia, TIME OF PLOT: The late 1960's
Watching me watching you  

(Le monde diplomatique oct 2009)

We've all spent so much time and effort being worried about formal surveillance – all those street and lobby cameras – that we're in danger of forgetting how much we cooperate in surveilling and being surveilled online. **By Miyase Christensen**

New research suggests that 25% of people in the UK suffer from some form of paranoia (1), probably because of a combination of urbanisation, globalisation, migration, wealth disparity and the media. So would it be right to assume that paranoia will worsen as we move towards complex personal surveillance, the result of the heavy use of social networking sites such as Facebook? While these sites are collecting data on their users, as my own research in Sweden illustrates, many of us are taking part in this on a seemingly voluntary basis, often unaware of its extent.

Formal surveillance means one CCTV camera per 14 citizens in the UK, or 200,000 such cameras in the city of Shenzhen in China. But parallel to the traditional forms of surveillance, there is a new voyeurism, rooted in an appetite for peer-to-peer surveillance. Watching friends, neighbours and colleagues for security purposes – and sometimes just for fun – seems to be getting common[...].

Google Street View, launched in 2007, provides images from countries such as the US, France, UK, Japan and New Zealand and means to expand further. Although Google claims that those who thought it a breach of privacy can request that images be blurred, most people remain unaware that their houses or cars might be on display.

On the internet, surveillance is commerce. The number of Facebook users has soared, followed by MySpace and Twitter, much to the joy of marketers. Online industries look for new trends, and respond by incorporating social networking features, such as personal profiles, into sites such as YouTube. Perhaps the current social networking hype reveals a latent desire for a brother-to-brother fraternal gaze, or innocent “friendly encounters of the voyeuristic kind”. We could see it as “complicit surveillance” (2) mundanely committed by the individual, but sinisterly co-opted.

With about 300 million Facebook users [the latest figure of 2019 talks about 2.3 billion users]⁹, a speculative value of $15bn and advertisers eavesdropping on every move of members, Facebook deserves special attention for surveillance in the net-watched society. People use it for serious political campaigning and to post what they ate for dinner. Many may object to Facebook’s right to exploit user content for commercial purposes, but they go on using it for personal or practical reasons. …

Facebook’s questionable use of user information did not go unnoticed. The Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) announced this year it would file a formal complaint with the US Federal Trade Commission about Facebook’s updated licences. More than 40,000 Facebook users joined forces with bloggers and consumer rights groups to protest a change in the terms of use that Facebook had secretly implemented, especially its decision to grant itself broader rights to users’ information, even after users cancelled accounts. …

Although Facebook seems low-key over advertising, it tracks user behaviour, making note of which fan sites are visited or how long is spent on a shopping site. In a heavily mediated social environment, what is private, what is public, and what is publicly permissible (on the basis of

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⁹ The Economist, Feb 14th 2019.
consent) are elusive and contested ideas. But lines can be drawn quickly, and Facebook is the laboratory environment in which to test the limits of tolerance. […]

Young users

Yet, the actual extent of commercial surveillance on Facebook remains murky. According to their privacy policy, Facebook retains the right to collect information about their members from other sources such as newspapers, instant messaging services and blogs “to provide you with more useful information and a more personalised experience”. By using Facebook, you also consent to have your personal data transferred to, and processed in, the US. Users are not notified when and how their data is used.

The group also addressed vulnerability as many users in Canada are between 14 and 25. Most users, of course, accept Facebook’s default settings without considering what this means in privacy and data storage. While Facebook rejected the validity of concerns on the grounds that the sharing of user information is on a consensual basis, the report suggests that even if the users select the strongest privacy settings available, their information may still be shared more widely if their Facebook friends have lower privacy settings. A survey suggests that 45% of employers in the US admit to checking the social networking site profiles of prospective employees (3). The actual number might be higher.

The popularity of Facebook and the availability of personal demographic data have legal implications…. In the US, some schools and colleges now try to control content on their students’ personal blogs or Facebook pages – some students have been expelled – raising serious questions about free speech…. Much of the responsibility for raising awareness seems to fall on civil society and citizen groups; web-savvy users have to continue a public negotiation process to control how we engage with technology and who uses what online, and to what ends. In the absence of effective regulatory mechanisms to limit the data-surveilling activities of companies, using online social media can be risky. The EU Commission warned this year that data-collection from such sites might lead to consumers being inundated with unsolicited advertising or their data being used by the governments in ways that compromise civil liberties.

With surveillance embedded in most aspects of everyday life from supermarket cards to website cookies, what matters now is not “us” being watched, but the information we “leak” (4). … Newer media technologies are restructuring the nature of information-sharing and communications on a day-to-day basis, with long-term influences we have yet to see.

Femininity – Masculinity

Notions of Gender and Feminism

It is now accepted practice to make a distinction between sex and gender.

The first is a biological category, the second a social construct. This means, in effect, that a biologically male person can be feminine and a biologically female person can be masculine.

Masculinity and femininity then, can be described in terms of the qualities ascribed to them. Femininity is usually equated with passive qualities—something you can check for yourself by compiling a list of binary qualities and analysing the traditional associations with gender.

[…] You will remember that binaries are hierarchical and function on an unequal plane, so that one is considered ‘better’ than the other. Feminist critics have pointed out that ‘feminine’ qualities are always the weaker half of the binary.

Masculinity and femininity make up one binary—which one is considered stronger? Keep in mind that the relations of power between the genders are fundamentally unequal—this is what is meant by patriarchy.

Feminism believes it is of vital importance to make a distinction between sex and gender, because when these two categories are blurred into each other the qualities of femininity are naturalized. This means that it becomes possible to say women are meek, timid, gentle and submissive with the same authority that one can say women have ovaries.

In fact, it becomes possible almost to say that women have these qualities because they have ovaries or just like they have ovaries—to ascribe these qualities to biology and make them seem natural and inherent rather than constructed. If women’s ‘weakness’ or ‘inferiority’ is a biological fact, it can no longer be questioned and the status-quo can be maintained. This notion of the construction of gender in unequal ways is at the heart of feminism.

Feminism is too large a term to cover here, because there are many feminisms. Indeed, it is inaccurate to think of feminism as one unified entity—the reality is that there are different kinds of feminism and not all of them agree on everything.

All feminisms however, are political discourses that are concerned with gender inequalities and their consequences to women in different spheres. Feminists over the years have analysed different issues and brought to light the workings of patriarchy in different areas. These analyses have included critiques of language, where they have shown how language is inherently biased in favour of the masculine, and the feminine is made invisible or inconsequential—think of the implications of words like mankind and history and their usage, and the even more damaging use of the generic pronoun ‘he’ to refer to any neutral human activity. Other areas of critique range from literature to politics to health.

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ADVERTISING THEN AND NOW
by Renée D. Turner

It’s inevitable! Hardly an hour goes by in which we do not encounter some form of advertising. Thousands of products compete for our time and attention in the course of a day. Because advertisers spend billions of dollars a year to get consumers to buy and use their products, it is important for a company to make its advertisements stand out.

Ads seen today have their roots in age-old advertising techniques. Inscriptions on tablets, walls, and papyrus from ancient Babylonia, Egypt, and Greece listed available products. Signs and town criers advertised goods and services before the advent of type in the early 1500s made it possible for retailers to distribute messages to the masses through printed materials. The word advertisement appeared in print around 1655, when publishers used it to describe their announcements of new books. By 1660, all types of business owners used it to refer to their own announcements of products available for consumers. Advertisers later took advantage of the invention of the popular magazine to present images of their goods. During World War I, magazines promoted the sale of liberty bonds to a patriotic public. This was the birth of public service advertising.

After the war, consumers were eager for new goods and services. New products were developed, and the J. Walter Thompson agency-through innovative writing, management, and research techniques-created the concept of brand names, such as Coca-Cola and Jell-O, to help consumers identify a particular product.

The need for advertising diminished during and after the economy collapsed in the Great Depression of 1929, and there was wide use of the hard sell approach, in which high-pressure tactics were employed to sell products.

In the 1930s, technology revolutionized advertising. Radio programs, which offered the listener an inexpensive form of entertainment, were underwritten by advertisers. By the end of the 1950s, television had become the dominant advertising medium. In the U.S., for example, ad revenues grew from $12.3 million in 1949 to $128 million by 1951.

The abundance of so many similar products in the 1950s gave rise to the idea that ads should promote unique advantages that no other competitors’ product offered. This led to the technique of using slogans such as that of a certain coffee that “was good to the last drop” and that of a candy that “melts in your mouth, not in your hands.”

Endorsement of products by movie stars, doctors, and other famous people was a popular technique. Then, in the 1960s, the Leo Burnett agency created cartoon characters such as the Pillsbury Dough Boy, who sold baked goods; a tiger named Tony, who touted a breakfast cereal; and a real, live cat named Morris, who would eat only a certain kind of cat food.

Then came the idea of promoting a certain image. The biggest proponent of this technique was David Ogilvy, whose firm, Ogilvy and Mather, promoted a brand of food products by using the image of a farm character with a down-home twang and attitude to convey the idea of “old-fashioned goodness.”

The Vietnam war and the ensuing economic downturn of the 1970s put a new emphasis on accountability and advertising results. Ads were strategically placed, and “safe” was the byword. Advertisers touted

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products with commercials that emphasized practical, real-life situations. The focus on performance and profit continued through the 1980s, and more agencies used coupons, rebates, and sweepstakes to generate short-term sales gains. These days advertising is in a state of flux. But industry insiders say the new wave will focus on creativity and profitability and balance information with persuasion in ad design.

Long before consideration of ad design and strategies, however, advertisers must first determine which segment of the buying public is more likely to buy or use their products and how to convince that group of their products’ benefits. After advertisers identify a specific consumer group, they entice that group to use the product or service featured.

Vocabulary practice
Match the words with the letters corresponding to their meanings in the empty space.

1. inevitable … 2.advent … 3.retailers… 4.innovative … 5.brand name …

a. money earned b. new, original c. pay for, support d. persuade, tempt e. unavoidable f. change, movement g. coming, invention h. memorable phrase i. people who sell directly to the consumer j. a unique name given to a product
The Clash of Civilizations

The Clash of Civilizations is a theory, proposed by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world.

The theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?", in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. Due to an enormous response and the solidification of his views, Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

The term itself was first used by Bernard Lewis in an article in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic Monthly titled The Roots of Muslim Rage.

Introduction

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense.

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines.

As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict. In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics[...].

Definitions, Argumentation

The definition, nomenclature, and even the number of civilizations are somewhat ambiguous in Huntington's works. Civilizations may consist of states and social groups (such as ethnic and religious minorities). Predominant religion seems to be the main criterion of his classification, but in some cases geographical proximity and linguistic similarity are important as well. Using various studies of history, Huntington divided the world into three "major" civilizations in his thesis:

- Western civilization, centered on Australasia, Northern America, Europe, Latin America and The Orthodox world of the former Soviet Union
- The Eastern world is the mix of the Buddhist, Sinic, Hindu, and Japonic civilizations.
- The Muslim world of the Greater Middle East

Huntington argues that the trends of global conflict after the end of the Cold War are increasingly appearing at these civilizational divisions. Wars such as those following the break up of Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, and between India and Pakistan were cited as evidence of inter-civilizational conflict.

Adapted from Wikipedia (Access date : February 20, 1010)
Huntington also argues that the widespread Western belief in the universality of the West's values and political systems is naïve and that continued insistence on democratization and such "universal" norms will only further antagonize other civilizations. Huntington sees the West as reluctant to accept this because it built the international system, wrote its laws, and gave it substance in the form of the United Nations.

Huntington identifies a major shift of economic, military, and political power from the West to the other civilizations of the world, most significantly to what he identifies as the two "challenger civilizations", Sinic and Islam.

In Huntington's view, East Asian Sinic civilization is culturally asserting itself and its values relative to the West due to its rapid economic growth. Specifically, he believes that China's goals are to reassert itself as the regional hegemon, and that other countries in the region will 'bandwagon' with China due to the history of hierarchical command structures implicit in the Confucian Sinic civilization, as opposed to the individualism and pluralism valued in the West.

In other words, regional powers such as the two Koreas and Vietnam will acquiesce to Chinese demands and become more supportive of China rather than attempting to oppose it. Huntington therefore believes that the rise of China poses one of the most significant problems and the most powerful long-term threat to the West, as Chinese cultural assertion clashes with the American desire for the lack of a regional hegemony in East Asia.

Huntington argues that the Islamic civilization has experienced a massive population explosion which is fueling instability both on the borders of Islam and in its interior, where fundamentalist movements are becoming increasingly popular. Manifestations of what he terms the "Islamic Resurgence" include the 1979 Iranian revolution and the first Gulf War.

Perhaps the most controversial statement Huntington made in the Foreign Affairs article was that "Islam has bloody borders". Huntington believes this to be a real consequence of several factors, including the previously mentioned Muslim youth bulge and population growth and Islamic proximity to many civilizations including Sinic, Orthodox, Western, and African.

Huntington also argues that civilizational conflicts are "particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims", identifying the "bloody borders" between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations.

He believes that some of the factors contributing to [these conflicts] are that both Christianity (upon which Western civilization is based) and Islam are:

- **Missionary** religions, seeking conversion by others.
- **Universal**, "all-or-nothing" religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one
- **Teleological** religions, that is, that their values and beliefs represent the goals of existence and purpose in human existence.

More recent factors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash, Huntington wrote, are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of Western universalism - that is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western values - that infuriate Islamic fundamentalists.

All these historical and modern factors combined, Huntington wrote briefly in his Foreign Affairs article and in much more detail in his 1996 book, would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations. Along with Sinic-Western conflict, he believed, the Western-Islamic clash would represent the bloodiest conflicts of the early 21st century. Thus, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent events including the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have been widely viewed as a vindication of the Clash theory.13

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13 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Huntington has been increasingly regarded by the right wing as having been visionary in light of: The United States invasion of Afghanistan; The 2002 Bali Bombings; The 2003 Invasion of Iraq; The 2004 Madrid train bombings; The 2006 cartoon crisis; The 2005 London bombings; The ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis; The 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict; The 2008-09 Israel-Gaza conflict. These events have fueled a perception among foreign policy hawks and conservatives that Huntington's Clash is well underway.
FURTHER READING
The Need for Cultural Studies: Resisting Intellectuals and Oppositional Public Spheres

Henry Giroux, David Shumway, Paul Smith, and James Sosnoski

Introduction
In North American universities the study of culture is so fragmented through specialization that concerted cultural critique is almost impossible. The historical development of insulated disciplines housed in segregated departments has produced a legitimating ideology that in effect suppresses critical thought. Rationalized as the protection of the integrity of specific disciplines, the departmentalization of inquiry has contributed to the reproduction of the dominant culture by isolating its critics from each other. Under the banner of the academic freedom of experts to direct their own activity, specialists now bind themselves in discursive formations that generally circumscribe the nature of their inquiries.

The practitioners of disciplines investigating cultural phenomena e.g., anthropology, sociology, history, literary studies--are limited in their ability to communicate with each other about their common concerns. Traditional literary study, for instance, has developed within formalistic parameters that set an almost impassable boundary between the study of a society and the study of a novel; similarly, sociologists make use of literature in ways that alienate traditional literary critics. And so on. The conventional wisdom for academics is to let members of other departments do whatever they say is their work in whatever way they choose--as long as this right is granted to them. As a consequence of these developments, the study of culture is conducted in fragments. And, in so far as experts must define themselves over and against a public comprised of amateurs, specialization removes intellectuals from other public spheres. Critique is thus disabled and the mechanisms of both social and cultural reproduction enabled.

The role of the specialist is not altogether compatible with the role of the intellectual. As Paul Piccone remarks,

unless one fudges the definition of intellectuals in terms of purely formal and statistical educational criteria, it is fairly clear that what modern society produces is an army or alienated, privatized, and uncultured experts who are knowledgeable only within very narrowly defined areas. This technical intelligentsia, rather than intellectuals in the traditional sense of thinkers concerned with the totality, is growing by leaps and bounds to run the increasingly complex bureaucratic and industrial apparatus. Its rationality, however, is only instrumental in character, and thus suitable mainly to
perform partial tasks rather than tackling substantial questions of social organization and political direction. [4]

The argument of our essay is that there is a need for cultural studies to engage critically exactly those social and political issues to which Piccone alludes, and to promote an understanding of both the enabling and constraining dimensions of culture. This suggests both the development of a critique and the production of cultural forms consonant with emancipatory interests. One important task for such a transformative critique is to identify the fissures in the ideologies of the dominant culture. In the absence of intellectuals who can critically analyze a society's contradictions, the dominant culture continues to reproduce its worst effects all the more efficaciously. And, without a sphere for cultural critique, the resisting intellectual has no voice in public affairs.

This essay begins by showing how definitions of disciplines are historically arbitrary. It then goes on to argue that attempts to cut across the arbitrary boundaries set by disciplines and to develop interdisciplinary programs--American or Canadian Studies, Women's Studies, Black Studies, etc.--have failed. Next, the essay argues that the traditional humanist rationale for the disciplinary study of culture is inappropriate in that it masks the role that members of a culture can play as agents in its formation. This leads us to argue for the necessity of a counter-disciplinary praxis. At this point, we introduce the notion of the resisting intellectual as an educational formation necessary to restore to academics their roles as intellectuals. The sections that follow sketch out some of the implications of our argument: a return of intellectuals from ivory-towered departments to the public sphere; and a movement away from individualist, esoteric research towards collective inquiries into social ills. The essay concludes by outlining conditions for the development of Cultural Studies.

I. The Arbitrariness of Disciplines and the Failure of Interdisciplines

Most of us think of academic disciplines as the reflection of more or less 'natural' categories of things which we call subjects. English is different from history because literature and history are two distinct sorts of thing. But if we consider the matter further we soon recognize that the identification of a discipline with natural objects doesn't explain very much. In the first place, a particular group of objects is the subject of any number of disciplines. The same text, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* for example, can be studied both by literary scholars and historians. Secondly, the particular objects which a discipline studies do not remain the same throughout its history. 'Literature' has had its current reference--fiction, poetry, and drama--only since the early 19th century. Furthermore, the way in which categories are defined regularly changes. English has been recognized as a legitimate area of study only since the late nineteenth century, and new subdisciplines in physics or chemistry have been emerging at an ever increasing pace.
What is studied under the aegis of an academic discipline at any given time is not a natural subject matter, but a field which is itself constituted in the practice of the discipline. Such a field is not arbitrary in the sense that it develops randomly or on whim; rather, a field can be called arbitrary because it is contingent on historical circumstance. Hence it reflects cultural, social, and institutional demands. This is true of all academic fields, but especially so in fields outside the natural sciences. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to look more closely at the formation of academic disciplines.

Michel Foucault has shown that discipline as a particular strategy of social control and organization began at the end of the Classical age and came into dominance in the modern period. Though Foucault is not directly concerned with academic disciplines, much of his analysis applies to these enterprises. What is characteristic of disciplinary technologies is their capacity simultaneously to normalize and hierarchize, to homogenize and differentiate. The paradox is explained by the control which discipline asserts over difference. Because norms are carefully established and maintained, deviation can be measured on a scale. The goal of the professional in a discipline is always to move up this scale by differing only in the appropriate ways.

It does not require Foucauldian analysis to understand that a discipline limits discourse. To be part of a discipline means to ask certain questions, to use a particular set of terms, and to study a relatively narrow set of things. But Foucault's work does help us to see how these limitations, this discipline, are enforced by institutions through various rewards and punishments most of which pertain to hierarchical ranking. The ultimate punishment is exclusion. If one ceases to speak within the discourse of the discipline, one will no longer be considered part of it. This does not usually mean that heretics will be prohibited from teaching or even from publishing; rather, they are simply marginalized. The situation is similarly severe for the new Ph.D. for whom the price of admission into the academy is the same conformity with dominant academic discourses.

Even though the development of normal science in Kuhn's sense distinguishes the natural sciences from other disciplines, 'The human sciences constantly try to copy the natural sciences' exclusion from their theories of any references to the [social and historical] background.' In the social sciences and humanities there has been an increasing normalization consistent with the professionalization of the various disciplines, but it is clear that no discipline has succeeded in completely excluding 'background' from its theories. Formalizing techniques can make normal science possible in the social sciences and the humanities only by excluding the social skills, institutions, and power arrangements that make the isolation of attributes possible. This practice ignores the social practice and cultural interaction of social scientists and humanists.

Because social practice is not one of the objects constituted by the natural sciences, 'it is always possible and generally desirable that an unchallenged normal science which defines and resolves problems concerning the structure of the physical universe establish itself, [but] in the social sciences such an unchallenged normal science would only indicate that an orthodoxy had established itself, not through scientific achievement, but
by ignoring the background and eliminating all competitors.' [7] Although humanistic disciplines allow a wider variety of activities than do the disciplines of the natural sciences, these activities themselves are hierarchically valued. In English, for instance, normal study under the New Critical 'paradigm' was the acontextual interpretation of individual texts of the literary canon. Other kinds of scholarship were permitted and sometimes rewarded, but were never allowed to overshadow normal New Critical practice. Historical scholarship, in this instance, had its place, but it was regarded as subsidiary to New Criticism. [8]

Although work in the humanities does not pose as normal science, its disciplinary structure aims at producing specialists. The disciplinary structure of study in literature, history, sociology, and other divisions that often focus on culture, tends to prohibit these specialists from relating their knowledge to public spheres. Disciplinary study requires constant attention to those few questions that constitute its current specialized concern. These questions are inevitably far removed from the genuine controversies in a given culture.

Interdisciplinary movements such as American Studies and Women's Studies have often developed out of the sense that the most important issues were being lost in the cracks between the rigid boundaries of the disciplines. As a consequence, American Studies began with the agenda of retrieving such issues. It should be remembered that the nationalism which spawned American Studies and Canadian Studies was openly political, and that American Studies books were critical of the ideological interests embedded in canonical documents of American culture. Nevertheless, American Studies should be regarded as a cautionary example to those who would try to establish Cultural Studies as an interdisciplinary enterprise within the academy. The problem is that no solid alternatives to disciplinary structure have evolved within the academy and, as a result, movements such as American Studies paradoxically must strive to become disciplines. Thus, while these movements often begin with a critical perspective, they retreat from radical critique as they become more successful. To the extent that such movements resist disciplines, their seriousness is questioned. Practitioners are regarded as dilettantes rather than real scholars, and their enterprises are written off as mere fads. In American Studies, the idea of interdisciplinarity became a means for practitioners to challenge a particular hierarchy, but it did not offer an alternative to hierarchical order. And as American Studies became more entrenched, interdisciplinarity receded in importance in the rhetoric of the movement. [9]

It would be a mistake to regard the failure of interdisciplinary movements to remain critical enterprises as the result of the suppression of political ideas. Because an intellectual's political views are posited as irrelevant to the work of disciplines themselves, speaking and thinking about political and social questions is construed as merely eccentric to the disciplinary study of culture. This failure to engage historical contexts and social particularities can be seen most clearly in the type of pedagogy that traditional disciplines institute.

**Difficulties with the Traditional Rationale of the Study of Culture**
Broadly speaking, the rationale of traditional humanistic education is that it offers students assured access to a storehouse of cultural materials which is constituted as a canon. Such a canon is, of course, relatively flexible in its definition insofar as it can incorporate and take cognizance of both marginal and recondite materials; as a thesaurus of sorts it cannot pass up anything of value. The values that are operational here do fluctuate according to specific ideological needs—witness the now quite secure incorporation of a women's studies canon or even a literary theory canon into some university curricula. But, at the same time, there is an always implicit 'gold standard' by which these provisional incrementations and fluctuations are regulated. Just recently, the head of NEH, William Bennett, conducted an ad hoc survey to discover what books every high school student 'might reasonably be expected to have studied' before graduation. The list of such books, thirty in all, ranged from Plato's Republic, through some Virgil, Chaucer, Dickens and Tolstoy, to Catcher in the Rye. These books and authors represent the regulatory standard of a certain cultural currency by which the humanities and their productions are measured. A familiarity with the stable central core of the canon is said to enable students to absorb the values enshrined there, to the point that they could apply those values to its more marginal or provisional components. Most importantly, students would have access to a wealth which is 'humanizing' in its effect; but that effect is a complicity with the economy which has produced that wealth for humanity.

Leaving aside the not unimportant questions of how this project for the humanities is effected ideologically, and of how it relates in practice to students' lived lives (their individual socio-economic histories), it is important to ask whether or not it would be desirable or even necessary for Cultural Studies to appropriate or exploit in any way the same kind of educational rationale. After all, and as the new right is quick to point out, that rationale has always taken seriously the ideological effect and function for students of what is taught. By learning the dominant culture, or imbibing its representative values, students are theoretically enabled in that they are given the wherewithal for particular manners of action and behaviour within that culture. The argument can easily be made (as it is often made in Women's Studies, for example, that the teaching of an alternative substance, of a new canon, can effectively produce new ideological positions and thence political actions.

However, it must be remembered that the humanist rationale for the canon is based upon an hierarchical economy where cultural objects are ranked. Certain of those objects (Shakespeare's writing, for example) are assumed to be 'the best' of western culture; they thus represent, synecdochally, the essence of the culture. It is exactly this symbolic view of culture against which Cultural Studies should fight. The installation of a new canon, constructed on assumptions about what is most important and valuable for students to know or be familiar with, merely replicates the traditional hierarchical view of culture, albeit in a novel and perhaps minimally subversive form. Cultural Studies, on the other hand, should be built upon a different economy, one which sees that cultural objects are, in fact, disposed relationally.
This is to say that Cultural Studies look with suspicion upon any hierarchizing project through which culture is synecdochally delimited to certain of its parts, whether such parts represent the culture's essential 'best' or even if they represent what has been predetermined as politically or ethically important and valuable. Cultural Studies should, in short, abandon the goal of giving students access to that which represents a culture. Instead, Cultural Studies has the possibility of investigating culture as a set of activities which is lived and developed within asymmetrical relations of power, or as irreducibly a process which cannot be immobilized in the image of a storehouse.

By investigating and teaching the claim that culture is in a real sense unfinished, Cultural Studies can secure its own political effectiveness. Students—particularly those marginalised by the values of the dominant culture—can be disabused of the notion that the culture they actually inhabit is somehow not theirs or available to them only through proper initiation into the values enshrined in representative texts. Cultural Studies, taking new (i.e. necessarily non-canonical) objects and implicating them in a relational rather than hierarchical view, encourages a questioning of the premises of dominant educational and political practices. Most importantly, Cultural Studies can refuse to agree that 'literature [and any other cultural object]...is distinct from politics' and can thus re-consider the ideological and political appurtenance of a text or any set of texts.

Clearly, what is at stake here is the possibility that Cultural Studies could promote in students, not a striving after a predetermined or a once-and-for-all complacent accession to a given set of cultural values, but rather a continual analysis of their own conditions of existence. Such a praxis, founded in an overthrowing of the preassumptions of traditional disciplinary approaches to culture, is a pre-requisite for self conscious and effective resistance to dominant structures.

II. The Need for a Counter-Disciplinary Praxis

In the first section of the essay we pointed out that disciplines concerned with the analysis of culture, including those called humanistic, have attempted to model themselves on the pattern of 'normal science.' Their aim is to describe culture, to accumulate knowledge about a culture. In the preceding section we argued that such an aim leaves the impression on students that a culture has a permanent character and that specific structures can be described in an essentialist manner. Such procedures are especially pernicious in those disciplines associated with the humanities since they suggest that the culture has already been formed rather than that it is in the process of transformation.

Cultural Studies should resist such tendencies. This requires a movement away from our de-contextualized conception of disciplinary practices toward a 'conception of human Praxis, emphasising that human beings are neither to be treated as passive objects nor as wholly free subjects,' since the study of human life is properly 'the study of definite social practices, geared to human needs.'

Given the disciplinary mechanisms at work in the structure of Western universities, such a praxis is necessarily counter-disciplinary in the sense that it resists the notion that the
study of culture is the accumulation of knowledge about it. In our view, the proper study of culture is 'intrinsically involved with that which has to be done' in societies rife with oppression. The precondition of such action is critical resistance to prevailing practices. However, resistance will not be effective if it is random and isolated; intellectuals must play the crucial role of mobilizing such resistance into a praxis that has political impact.

**Resisting Intellectuals**

Central to the emancipatory project that informs our notion of Cultural Studies is a reformulation of the role of the intellectual both within and outside the university. We concur with Gramsci that it is important to view intellectuals in political terms. The intellectual is more than a person of letters, or a producer and transmitter of ideas. Intellectuals are also mediators, legitimators, and producers of ideas and practices; they perform a function eminently political in nature. Gramsci distinguishes between conservative and radical organic intellectuals. Conservative organic intellectuals provide the dominant classes with forms of moral and intellectual leadership. As agents of the status quo, such intellectuals identify with the dominant relations of power and become, consciously or unconsciously, the propagators of its ideologies and values. They provide the ruling classes with rationales for economic, political and ethical formations.

According to Gramsci, conservative organic intellectuals can be found in all strata of advanced industrial society--in industrial organizations, in universities, in the culture industry, in various forms of management, and so on. He claims that radical organic intellectuals also attempt to provide the moral and intellectual leadership for the working class. More specifically, radical organic intellectuals provide the pedagogical and political skills that are necessary to raise political awareness in the working class, and to help it develop leadership and engage in collective struggle.

Gramsci's analysis is helpful in formulating one of the central goals of Cultural Studies: the creation of what we want to call resisting intellectuals. This differs from Gramsci's notion of radical organic we believe that such intellectuals can emerge from and work with any number of groups which resist the suffocating knowledge and practices that constitute their social formation. Resisting intellectuals can provide the moral, political and pedagogical leadership for those groups which take as their starting point the transformative critique of the conditions of oppression. The epithet 'organic' in our case cannot be reserved for those intellectuals who take the working class as the only revolutionary agent.

The notion of the resisting intellectual is important in the most immediate sense because it makes visible the paradoxical position in which radical intellectuals in higher education find themselves in the 1980's. On the one hand, such intellectuals earn a living within institutions that play a fundamental role in producing the dominant culture. On the other hand, radical intellectuals define their political terrain by offering to students forms of oppositional discourse and critical social practices at odds with the hegemonic role of the university and the society which it supports. In many cases, this paradox works in favor of the university:
More often than not, [the] goal has been to elaborate disciplines rather than develop projects, to meld the bloodless tenets of semiology, systems theory, pragmatism and positivism with the archaicisms of historical materialism. The unflagging appetite of these leftist intellectuals to gain credibility within their respective disciplines, to be *au courrant* and appreciated as its 'left wing' and its most 'forward looking tendency,' is appalling evidence that what we lack is...a revolutionary intellectual movement. [15]

Bookchin's remarks remind us that critical scholarship is generally removed from any relation to concrete political movements; radical social theory becomes a mere commodity for academic journals and conferences; and radical intellectuals get safely ensconced within a tenure system that offers them as proof of the university's commitment to liberal pluralism.

Rather than surrender to this form of academic and political incorporation, Cultural Studies needs to define the role of the resisting intellectual as a counter-hegemonic practice that can both avoid and challenge it. In general terms, we can point to the following pedagogical and strategic activities. *First*, Cultural Studies needs to develop a curriculum and a pedagogy that stress the mediating and political role of intellectuals. This means providing students with the critical tools they will need to both understand and dismantle the chronic rationalization of harmful social practices, while simultaneously appropriating the knowledge and skills they need to rethink the project of human emancipation. *Secondly*, resisting intellectuals must actively engage in projects which encourage them to address their own critical role in the production and legitimation of social relations. Such projects are necessary not only to fight against conservative intellectuals and the multiple contexts in which legitimation processes occur, but also to broaden the theoretical and political movements outside the university. Resisting intellectuals must develop and work with movements outside of the limiting contours of the disciplines, symposia, and reward systems that have become the sole referent for intellectual activity. More importantly, such a project broadens the notion of education and takes seriously Gramsci's notion of all society as a vast school. [16] In addition, it encourages resisting intellectuals to play an active role in the many public spheres that are developing around various ideological conflicts.

Cultural Studies thus posits the need for resisting intellectuals who can establish new forms of political relations within and outside the university. In this theoretical context, Cultural Studies echoes Gramsci's call for radical intellectuals to forge alliances around new historical blocs. Intellectuals can play an important role in empowering individuals and groups within oppositional public domains.

**Public Spheres, Popular Culture and Cultural Studies**

The importance for Cultural Studies of participating in oppositional public spheres is an underlying premise of this essay. A counterdisciplinary praxis undertaken by resisting intellectuals would not be effective if it had as its only audience people in universities. Rather, it should take place more extensively in public. Although many universities are public institutions, we rarely consider them part of the public sphere.
If Cultural Studies is to be understood as an oppositional public sphere, it should not be conceived as a 'department' or as part of the boundary separating professional activities from those of amateurs. Instead of thinking of Cultural Studies in terms which more properly characterize disciplines, we should reconceive traditional rationales in an effort to create counter practices. The classroom, to take one instance, is viewed traditionally as a place where information is transmitted to students. Experts in a discipline impart to apprentices the received knowledge about a particular subject matter; students are not agents in this process, but passive and overtly uncritical receptacles. However, as we have argued, if we grant students an active role in the process of cultural formation, they can become agents in the production of social practices. To accomplish this we should become involved in fostering forms of resistance; a critical pedagogy is required which will promote the identification and analysis of the underlying ideological interests at stake in the text and its readings. We are then engaged together as resisting intellectuals in a social practice that allows both parties to construe themselves as agents in the process of their own cultural formation. An obvious concretization of this praxis might be a woman resisting the view of women proffered in a canonical novel. This instance is a reflection of resistance to large-scale social practices that oppress women. Such resistance needs to be produced. Rather than abandon scholarship, resisting intellectuals need to repoliticize it. Scholarly publications, the disciplinary criterion used to establish the merit of professional opinions against those of a public made up of amateurs, do not reach the public. Though it is not appropriate to argue the point here, we contend that the disciplines presently concerned with the study of culture are unduly bound to the premise that their task is to do disciplinary research, that is, to accumulate and store in a retrievable way descriptions of cultural phenomenon. But, if we reconceive our activity as the production of (rather than the description of social practices, then what we do in our classrooms is easily extended into public spheres. We cannot capitulate to the disciplinary notion that research has as its only audience other experts in the field. Resisting intellectuals must legitimate the notion of writing reviews and books for the general public, and they must create a language of critique balanced by a language of possibility that will that will enable social change. [17]

This means that we need to become involved in the political reading of popular culture. As Stanley Aronowitz remarks in 'Colonized Leisure, Trivialized Work,' 'It remains for us to investigate in what way mass culture becomes constitutive of social reality.' [18] Training in disciplinary practices leads us away from the study of the relation between culture and society and toward the accumulation of descriptions of cultural material cut off from its connection to everyday life. As Aronowitz points out:

To fully understand the ideological impact and manipulative functions of current media presentations, it is necessary to appreciate the multi-layered character of contemporary mass culture. In addition to the overt ideological content of films and television--transmitting new role models, values life styles to be more or less consciously emulated by a mass audience--there is also a series of covert messages contained within them which appeal to the audience largely on the unconscious level ....Typically, [these] define the character of the spectator's experience of the spectacle in terms of the...gratification of his or her unconscious desires....By creating a system of pseudo-
gratifications, mass culture functions as a sort of social regulator, attempting to absorb tensions arising out of everyday life and to detect frustrations which might otherwise actualize themselves in opposition to the system into channels which serve the system. [19]

It is because the effects of culture are so often unconsciously absorbed, that the need for a Cultural Studies emphasising critique arises. As we pointed out earlier in this essay, the disciplines that claim selected aspects of culture as their subject restrict that subject arbitrarily--for instance, by constituting the field of literary study as a canon. Simultaneously, they have placed a wedge between professionals and the public in the service of the ruling classes as in the case of literary study where so-called, 'low' culture is excluded from the research domain. Nor should we now continue to be fooled by the admission of films, popular novels, soap operas and the like into the curricula of literature departments. As long as such cultural artifacts are examined as merely the materials that make up a fixed culture, their disciplinary descriptions will do no more than create storehouses of knowledge having almost nothing to do with lived culture, much less its transformation. Only a counter-disciplinary praxis developed by intellectuals who resist disciplinary formation is likely to produce emancipatory social practices.

The problem with suggesting that Cultural Studies be counter disciplinary is that it cannot be housed in universities as they are presently structured. Hence the need for counter-institutions. There would be various sorts of collectives, variously membered--study groups, counter-disciplinary research groups, even societies and institutes.

It is unlikely that the disciplinary structures and mechanisms of universities will disappear in the near future. However, it would be a mistake to locate Cultural Studies within them. Our alternative would be to treat disciplines as peripheral to our main concerns while nonetheless obtaining some important concessions from their administrators. This is a tactical matter which has to be negotiated situation by situation. However, we can go even further and develop models of collaborative inquiry that extend beyond the university in order to combat hegemonic public spheres and to form alliances with other oppositional public spheres. In the context of Cultural Studies it will not be appropriate simply to generate idiosyncratic interpretations of cultural artifacts. The most important aim of a counter-disciplinary praxis is radical social change.

We should not be resigned to the roles that universities assign us. The resisting intellectual can develop a collective, counter-disciplinary praxis within the university that has a political impact outside it. The important tactical question at this moment in the history of North American universities is how to get Cultural Studies established as a form of cultural critique. Our suggestion has been the formation of institutes for cultural studies that can constitute an oppositional public sphere.

**Conclusion**

If Cultural Studies is to be informed by a political project that gives a central place to critique and social transformation, it will have to begin with a dual recognition. First, it
is imperative to recognize that the university has a particular set of relations with the dominant society. These relations define the university as neither a locus of domination nor a locus of freedom. Instead, the university, with relative autonomy, functions largely to produce and legitimate the knowledge skills and social relations that characterize the dominant power relations in society. Universities, like other public institutions, contain points of resistance and struggle, and it is within these spaces that the ideological and material conditions exist to produce oppositional discourses and practices. Such a recognition not only politicizes the university and its relation to the dominant society, it interrogates the political nature of Cultural Studies as both a sphere of critique and as a medium of social transformation. This leads to the second point.

If it is to be a radical social project, Cultural Studies must develop a self-regulating discourse; by this we mean a discourse that contains a language of critique and a concomitant language of possibility. In the first instance, it must lay bare the historically specific interests that structure the academic disciplines, the relations among them, and the manner in which the form and content of the disciplines reproduce and legitimate the dominant culture. This is a central task for Cultural Studies. For, if it is to promote an oppositional discourse and method of inquiry, it will have to embody interests that affirm rather than deny the political and normative importance of history, ethics and social interaction.

The discourse of Cultural Studies must resist the interests contained in the established academic disciplines and departments. It must interrogate the knowledge-claims and the modes of intelligibility central to the defense of the academic status quo in various departments and disciplines. Equally importantly, Cultural Studies must indict the interests embedded in the questions not asked within academic disciplines. That is, it must develop methods of inquiry into how the present absences and structured silences that govern teaching, scholarship, and administration within academic departments deny the link between knowledge and power, reduce culture to an unquestioned object of mastery, and refuse to acknowledge the particular way of life that dominant academic discourse helps to produce and legitimate.

In order to retain its theoretical and political integrity, Cultural Studies must develop forms of critical knowledge as well as a critique of knowledge itself. Such a task demands resistance to the reification and fragmentation that characterizes the disciplines. Because of their constitution, disciplinary structures obstruct the overthrowing of technical and social divisions of labor of which they are part and which they help to produce. Cultural Studies needs to develop a theory of the way in which different social formations are both produced and reproduced within the asymmetrical relations of power characterizing the dominant society. Similarly, it needs to develop a language of possibility, one in which knowledge would be viewed as part of a collective learning process connected to the dynamics of struggle both within and outside the university. Cultural Studies, in this sense, must develop an oppositional discourse and a counter-disciplinary praxis to deal with struggles over different orders of representation, conflicting forms of cultural experience, and diverse visions of the future. Clearly, the interests that inform such a problematic cannot be developed within traditional
departments. Currently, the structure of universities is inextricably tied to interests which suppress the critical concerns of intellectuals willing to fight for oppositional public spheres. Such interests can be dismantled in favor of more radical practices only through the collective efforts of resisting intellectuals.

NOTES

1. Our working definition of culture is taken from John Clarke, Stuart Hall. Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts' 'Subculture, Culture and Class' in Resistance Through Rituals, edited by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (London: Hutchinson Publicalions. 1976): 'By culture we undersland the shared principles of life characteristic or particular classes, groups or social milieux. Cultures are produccd as groups make sense of their social existence in the course of everyday experience Culture is intimate, therefore, with the world of practical action. It suffices, for most of the time, for managing everyday life. Since, however, this everyday world is itself problematic, culture must perforce take complex and heterogenous forms, not at all free from contradictions.' pages 10-17.

2. This remark is based on the work of several members of the Group for Research into the Institutionalization and Professionalization of Literary Study (GRIP) who have been examining the relationship between the historical development of disciplines and their departmentalization. See also Thomas S. Popkewitz Social Science and Social Amelioration: The Development or the American Academic Expert. in Paradigm and Ideology in Educational Research (Philadclphia: The Falmer Press. 1984), pp 107-128


10. See New York Times. August 13, 1984, p. 7. One wonders at the inclusion in this canonical list The Communist Manifesto; a symptom of paranoia or cautious liberalism, or both?

11. See PN Review 10:6, p. 4-5--a piece which is a quite typical expression of the new right's emergent views on the ideological relations of literature.


17. See Peter Hohendahl's The Institution of Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982). 44ff. and 242ff. for a discussion or this point.


19. Aronowitz. p 111.
WHY DON’T WE THINK OF NORTH AFRICA AS PART OF AFRICA?


When a Guardian article stated that Chigozie Obioma was the “sole African writer” to be longlisted for the 2015 Booker prize, the journalist in question had clearly forgotten there was life north of the Sahara. Thankfully, the Moroccan-born writer Laila Lalami, who was also longlisted, was quick to remind him, tweeting: “I am African. It’s an identity I’m often denied but that I will always insist upon”.

I know Lalami’s frustration well. Every time I have to declare my ethnicity I am reminded that “black African” is seemingly the only category that exists. Being both Algerian and British, I am constantly explaining why I identify as European and African – as though I’m “choosing” to be African, rather than it simply being a fact.

In politics and academia, north African countries are commonly grouped with the Middle East under the umbrella of MENA. In conferences I have been to on “African” issues, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have often had tokenistic representation, if any at all.

But the identity equation isn’t as simple as Arabic speakers equal Arab people. There are still communities across the Maghreb that speak Berber or Amazigh and a dialect called darija that heavily features French and Spanish phrases. Besides, being Arab isn’t an alternative to being African, or even black. Mauritanians and Sudanese can identify as all three at once.

The religion argument isn’t watertight either. Islam is the dominant religion in parts of east Africa and the Sahel, with notably large communities in Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Perhaps then, it simply boils down to colour. Could it be that to be African is to be black? And if so, what shade will do? Are the South Sudanese, with a pigment that is dark, rich and beautiful, more African than their neighbours to the north, of lighter skin? Surely a categorisation based on race is too reductive and ignores the continent’s great diversity in nations, cultures and ethnicities.


Whether through football, music or film, Algerians have more in common with Nigerians than Saudis. Ivorian coupé-décalé legends Magic System have joined forces with rai heavyweights Cheb Khaled and 113 as well as a number of lesser-known Maghrebi artists. During the African Cup of Nations, crowds cluster around televisions across the continent to see their national teams play, in an event that brings every corner of Africa together.

The migrant experience also unifies the continent. In France’s banlieues, immigrants from the former African colonies – north and south of the Sahara – share cramped conditions, as well as a

sense of isolation and discrimination. The Arabs driving sports cars or shopping on the Champs Elysées are more likely to be from the Gulf states than from the Maghreb.

Certainly there is something to be said about north Africans trying to distance themselves from “black Africa”. This is as much about sources of influence and power (after independence, countries like Egypt and Algeria looked to the Middle East for a model of an Islamic nation, or north to Europe for economic partnerships) as it is about the racism that exists here as it does everywhere else in the world.

Perhaps the glue that most strongly connects north Africa to the rest of the continent is colonial history. France’s colonial troops included soldiers from Algeria, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Niger and the Republic of Congo. These Africans fought side by side in the second world war and the traces of this are still present in the collective memory of these countries. The British used soldiers from Egypt, as well as many from the other former colonies including Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya.

In 1962 north Africa and South Africa were both struggling against colonialism and apartheid when Nelson Mandela went to receive military training with the Algerian FLN in Morocco. In 1969, Algiers hosted the Pan-African culture festival. Historically, African nations have had shared struggles.

Of course, north Africa benefits from being linked to the Middle East, both for business and development. Saudi is in the top five trading partners both for imports and exports with Egypt, but this relationship shouldn’t be exclusive. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt share not only a colonial past with the rest of Africa, but also a physical continent. Although identity is largely subjective, some things are irrefutable and north Africa being in Africa is part of that.
What would happen if Facebook were turned off?
Imagine a world without the social network. The Economist, Feb 14th 2019.

There has never been such an agglomeration of humanity as Facebook. Some 2.3bn people, 30% of the world’s population, engage with the network each month. Economists reckon it may yield trillions of dollars’ worth of value for its users. But Facebook is also blamed for all sorts of social horrors: from addiction and bullying to the erosion of fact-based political discourse and the enabling of genocide. New research—and there is more all the time—suggests such accusations are not entirely without merit. It may be time to consider what life without Facebook would be like.

To begin to imagine such a world, suppose that researchers could kick a sample of people off Facebook and observe the results. In fact, several teams of scholars have done just that. In January Hunt Allcott, of New York University, and Luca Braghieri, Sarah Eichmeyer and Matthew Gentzkow, of Stanford University, published results of the largest such experiment yet. They recruited several thousand Facebookers and sorted them into control and treatment groups. Members of the treatment group were asked to deactivate their Facebook profiles for four weeks in late 2018. The researchers checked up on their volunteers to make sure they stayed off the social network, and then studied what happened to people cast into the digital wilderness.

Those booted off enjoyed an additional hour of free time on average. They tended not to redistribute their liberated minutes to other websites and social networks, but chose instead to watch more television and spend time with friends and family. They consumed much less news, and were thus less aware of events but also less polarised in their views about them than those still on the network. Leaving Facebook boosted self-reported happiness and reduced feelings of depression and anxiety.

It also helped some to break the Facebook habit. Several weeks after the deactivation period, those who had been off Facebook spent 23% less time on it than those who had never left, and 5% of the forced leavers had yet to turn their accounts back on. And the amount of money subjects were willing to accept to shut their accounts for another four weeks was 13% lower after the month off than it had been before. Users, in other words,
overestimate how much they value the service: a misperception corrected by a month of abstention. Even so, most are loth to call it quits entirely. That reluctance would seem to indicate that Facebook, despite its problems, generates lots of value for consumers, which would presumably vanish were the network to disappear.

.... The more people on a network, the more potential connections it facilitates and the larger its value to each user. Such effects helped power Facebook’s rise; founded in 2004, it took off as the share of the population online grew explosively. New netizens naturally gravitated to the social network used by most of their friends and family, which reinforced Facebook’s advantages—in much the same way that a booming city attracts new residents because of the opportunities created by the large pool of people already there. You could say Facebook is the world’s first digital megacity, thronging with people, enabling huge amounts of human contact, both good and bad.

This article appeared in the Finance and economics section of the print edition under the headline "Replacebook"
**ORIENTALISM**

Edward Said’s publication of *Orientalism* [1978] made such an impact on thinking about colonial discourse that for three decades it has continued to be the site of controversy, adulation and criticism. Said’s intervention is designed to illustrate the manner in which the representation of Europe’s ‘others’ has been institutionalised since at least the eighteenth century as a feature of its cultural dominance. Orientalism describes the various disciplines, institutions, processes of investigation and styles of thought by which Europeans came to ‘know’ the ‘Orient’ over several centuries, and which reached their height during the rise and consolidation of nineteenth century imperialism. The key to Said’s interest in this way of knowing Europe’s others is that it effectively demonstrates the link between knowledge and power, for it ‘constructs’ and dominates Orientals in the process of knowing them. The very term ‘Oriental’ shows how the process works, for the word identifies and homogenises at the same time, implying a range of knowledge and an intellectual mastery over that which is named. Since Said’s analysis, Orientalism has revealed itself as a model for the many ways in which Europe’s strategies for knowing the colonized world became, at the same time, strategies for dominating that world.

… Orientalism, in Said’s formulation, is principally a way of defining and ‘locating’ Europe’s others. But as a group of related disciplines Orientalism was, in important ways, about Europe itself, and hinged on arguments that circulated around the issue of national distinctiveness, and racial and linguistic origins. Thus the elaborate and detailed examinations of Oriental languages, histories and cultures were carried out in a context in which the supremacy and importance of European civilisation was unquestioned. Such was the vigour of the discourse that myth, opinion, hearsay and prejudice generated by influential scholars quickly assumed the status of received truth. For instance, the influential French philologist and historian Ernest Renan (1823–92) could declare confidently that ‘Every person, however slightly he may be acquainted with the affairs of our time, sees clearly the actual inferiority of Mohammedan countries’ (1896: 85). We can be in no doubt about Renan’s audience, nor the nature of the cultural assumptions they shared:

> All those who have been in the East, or in Africa are struck by the way in which the mind of the true believer is fatally limited, by the species of iron circle that surrounds his head, rendering it absolutely closed to knowledge. (ibid.: 85)

… Despite the complexity and variety of Orientalist disciplines, the investigations of Orientalist scholars all operated within certain parameters, such as the assumption that Western civilisation was the pinnacle of historical development. Thus, Orientalist analysis almost universally proceeded to confirm the ‘primitive’, ‘originary’, ‘exotic’ and ‘mysterious’ nature of Oriental societies and, more often than not, the degeneration of the ‘non-European’ branches of the Indo-European family of languages. In this respect, Orientalism, despite the plethora of disciplines it fostered, could be seen to be what Michel Foucault calls a ‘discourse’: a coherent and strongly bounded area of social knowledge; a system of statements by which the world could be known (see p. 14).

There are certain unwritten (and sometimes unconscious) rules that define what can and cannot be said within a discourse, and the discourse of Orientalism had many such rules that operated within the area of convention, habit, expectation and assumption. In any attempt to gain knowledge about

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the world, what is known is overwhelmingly determined by the way it is known; the rules of a discipline determine the kind of knowledge that can be gained from it, and the strength, and sometimes unspoken nature, of these rules show an academic discipline to be a prototypical form of discourse. But when these rules span a number of disciplines, providing boundaries within which such knowledge can be produced, that intellectual habit of speaking and thinking becomes a discourse such as Orientalism. This argument for the discursive coherence of Orientalism is the key to Said’s analysis of the phenomenon and the source of the compelling power of his argument. European knowledge, by relentlessly constructing its subject within the discourse of Orientalism, was able to maintain hegemonic power over it. Focusing on this one aspect of the complex phenomenon of Orientalism has allowed Said to elaborate it as one of the most profound examples of the machinery of cultural domination, a metonymy of the process of imperial control and one that continues to have its repercussions in contemporary life. Orientalism, then, pivots on a demonstration of the link between knowledge and power, for the discourse of Orientalism constructs and dominates Orientals in the process of ‘knowing’ them.
Dreams of Trespass

Tales of a Harem Girlhood

By Fatima Mernissi

1. MY HAREM FRONTIERS

I WAS BORN in a harem in 1940 in Fez, a ninth century Moroccan city some five thousand kilometers west of Mecca, and one thousand kilometers south of Madrid, one of the dangerous capitals of the Christians. The problems with the Christians start, said Father, as with women, when the hudud, or sacred frontier, is not respected. I was born in the midst of chaos, since neither Christians nor women accepted the frontiers. Right on our threshold, you could see women of the harem contesting and fighting with Ahmed the doorkeeper as the foreign armies from the North kept arriving all over the city. In fact, foreigners were standing right at the end of our street, which lay just between the old city and the Ville Nouvelle, a new city that they were building for themselves. When Allah created the earth, said Father, he separated men from women, and put a sea between Muslims and Christians for a reason. Harmony exists when each group respects the prescribed limits of the other; trespassing leads only to sorrow and unhappiness. But women dreamed of trespassing all the time. The world beyond the gate was their obsession. They fantasized all day long about parading in unfamiliar streets, while the Christians kept crossing the sea, bringing death and chaos.

Trouble and cold winds come from the North, and we turn to the East to pray. Mecca is far. Your prayers might reach it if you know how to concentrate. I was to be taught how to concentrate when the time was appropriate. Madrid’s soldiers had camped north of Fez, and even Uncle ‘Ali and Father, who were so powerful in the city and ordered around everyone in the house, had to ask permission from Madrid to attend Moulay Abdesslam’s religious festival near Tangier, three hundred kilometers away. But the soldiers who stood outside our door were French, and of another tribe. They were Christians like the Spaniards, but they spoke another language and lived farther north. Paris was their capital. Cousin Samir said that Paris was probably two thousand kilometers away, twice as far away from us as Madrid, and twice as ferocious. Christians, just like Muslims, fight each other all the time, and the Spanish and the French almost killed one another when they crossed our frontier. Then, when neither was able to exterminate the other, they decided to cut Morocco in half. They put soldiers near ‘Arbaoua and said from now on, to go north, you needed a pass because you were crossing into Spanish Morocco. To go south, you needed another pass, because you were crossing into French Morocco. If you did not go along with what they said, you got stuck at ‘Arbaoua, an arbitrary spot where they had built a huge gate and said that it was a frontier. But Morocco, said Father, had

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exists undivided for centuries, even before Islam came along fourteen hundred years ago. No one ever had heard of a frontier splitting the land in two before. The frontier was an invisible line in the mind of warriors.

Cousin Samir, who sometimes accompanied Uncle and Father on their trips, said that to create a frontier, all you need is soldiers to force others to believe in it. In the landscape itself, nothing changes. The frontier is in the mind of the powerful. I could not go and see this for myself because Uncle and Father said that a girl does not travel. Travel is dangerous and women can’t defend themselves. Aunt Habiba, who had been cast off and sent away suddenly for no reason by a husband she loved dearly, said that Allah had sent the Northern armies to Morocco to punish the men for violating the hudud protecting women. When you hurt a woman, you are violating Allah’s sacred frontier. It is unlawful to hurt the weak. She cried for years.

Education is to know the hudud, the sacred frontiers, said Lalla Tam, the headmistress at the Koranic school where I was sent at age three to join my ten cousins. My teacher had a long, menacing whip, and I totally agreed with her about everything: the frontier, the Christians, education. To be a Muslim was to respect the hudud. And for a child, to respect the hudud was to obey. I wanted badly to please Lalla Tam, but once out of her earshot, I asked Cousin Malika, who was two years older than I, if she could show me where the hudud actually was located. She answered that all she knew for sure was that everything would work out fine if I obeyed the teacher. The hudud was whatever the teacher forbade. My cousin’s words helped me relax and start enjoying school.

But since then, looking for the frontier has become my life’s occupation. Anxiety eats at me whenever I cannot situate the geometric line organizing my powerlessness.

My childhood was happy because the frontiers were crystal clear. The first frontier was the threshold separating our family’s salon from the main courtyard. I was not allowed to step out into that courtyard in the morning until Mother woke up, which meant that I had to amuse myself from 6 A.M. to 8 A.M. without making any noise. I could sit on the cold white marble threshold if I wanted to, but I had to refrain from joining in with my older cousins already at play. "You don’t know how to defend yourself yet," Mother would say. "Even playing is a kind of war." I was afraid of war, so I would put my little cushion down on our threshold, and play l-msaria b-lglass (literally, "the seated promenade"), a game I invented then and still find quite useful today. You need only three things to play. The first is to be stuck somewhere, the second is to have a place to sit, and the third is to be in a humble state of mind, so you can accept that your time is worth nothing. The game consists in contemplating familiar grounds as if they were alien to you.

I would sit on our threshold and look at our house as if I had never seen it before. First, there was the square and rigid courtyard, where symmetry ruled everything. Even the white marble fountain, forever bubbling in the courtyard center, seemed controlled and
tamed. The fountain had a thin blue- and-white faience frieze all around its circumference, which reproduced the design inlaid between the square marble tiles of the floor. The courtyard was surrounded by an arched colonnade, supported by four columns on each side. The columns had marble at the top and the bottom, and blue-and-whitetilework in the middle, mirroring the pattern of the fountain and floor. Then, facing one another in pairs, across the courtyard, were four huge salons. Each salon had a gigantic gate in the middle, flanked by enormous windows, opening onto the courtyard. In the early morning, and in the winter, the salon gates would be shut tight with cedar wood doors carved with flowers. In the summer, the doors would be opened and drapes of heavy brocade, velvet, and lace let down, so breezes could flow in while light and noise were kept away. The salon windows had carved wooden shutters on the inside, similar to the doors, but from the outside all you could see were silver-plated, wrought-iron grilles, topped with wonderfully colored glass arches. I loved those colored glass arches, because of the way the rising morning sun kept changing their reds and blues to different hues, and softening the yellows. Like the heavy wooden doors, the windows were left wide open in the summer and the drapes were let down only at night or during afternoon nap times, to protect sleep.

When you lifted your eyes toward the sky, you could see an elegant two-story structure with the top floors repeating the square arched colonnade of the courtyard, completed with a parapet of silver-plated ironwork. And finally, you had the sky -- hanging up above but still strictly square-shaped, like all the rest, and solidly framed in a wooden frieze of fading gold-and-other geometric design.

Looking at the sky from the courtyard was an overwhelming experience. At first, it looked tame because of the manmade square frame. But then the movement of the early morning stars, fading slowly in the deep blue and white, became so intense that it could make you dizzy. In fact, on some days, especially during winter, when the purple and shocking-pink rays of the sun violently chased the last, stubborn twinkling stars from the sky, you could easily have become hypnotized. With your head tilted back, facing the squared sky, you would feel like going to sleep, but just then people would start invading the courtyard, coming up from everywhere, the doors and the stairs -- oh, I almost forgot the stairs. Lodged in the four corners of the courtyard, they were important because even grownups could play a sort of gigantic hide-and-go-seek on them, running up and down their glazed green steps.

Facing me across the courtyard was the salon of Uncle and his wife and their seven children, which was an exact reproduction of our own. Mother would not allow any publicly visible distinctions to be made between our salon and Uncle's, although Uncle was the firstborn son, and therefore traditionally entitled to larger and more elaborate living quarters. Not only was Uncle older and richer than Father, but he also had a larger immediate family. With my sister and brother and my parents, we only numbered five. Uncle's family totalled nine (or ten, counting his wife's sister who visited often from
Rabat, and sometimes stayed as long as six months at a time, after her husband married a second wife. But Mother, who hated communal harem life and dreamt of an eternal tête-à-tête with Father, only accepted what she called the 'azma (crisis) arrangement on the condition that no distinction be made between the wives. She would enjoy the exact same privileges as Uncle’s wife, despite their disparities in rank. Uncle scrupulously respected this arrangement because in a well-managed harem, the more power you have, the more generous you ought to be. He and his children ultimately did have more space, but it was on the top floors only, well away from the highly public courtyard. Power need not manifest itself blatantly.

Our paternal grandmother, Lalla Mani, occupied the salon to my left. We only went there twice a day, once in the morning to kiss her hand, and a second time in the evening to do the same. Like all the other salons, hers was furnished with silk brocade-covered sofas and cushions running along all four walls; a huge central mirror reflecting the inside of the gate door and its carefully studied draperies; and a pale, flowered carpet which completely covered the floor. We were never, never supposed to step on her carpet wearing our slippers -- or even worse, with wet feet, which was almost impossible to avoid doing in the summer, when the courtyard floor was cooled twice a day with water from the fountain. The young women of the family, such as my cousin Chama and her sisters, liked to clean the courtyard floor by playing la piscine (swimming pool), that is, by throwing buckets of water onto the floor and "accidently" splashing the person next to them. This, of course, encouraged the younger children -- specifically, my cousin Samir and I -- to run to the kitchen and come back armed with the water hose. Then we would do a really good splashing job, and everyone would be screaming and trying to stop us. Our shouts would inevitably disturb Lalla Mani, who would angrily raise her drapes and warn us that she was going to complain to Uncle and Father that very night. "I will tell them that no one respects authority in this house anymore," she would say. Lalla Mani hated water splashing and she hated wet feet. In fact, if we ran to talk to her after we had been standing near the fountain, she would always order us to stop where we were. "Don't talk to me with wet feet," she would say. "Go dry yourself first." As far as she was concerned, anyone who violated the Clean-and-Dry-Feet Rule was stigmatized for life, and if we dared to go so far as to trespass on or dirty her flowered carpet, we were reminded of our wayward deed for many years to come. Lalla Mani appreciated being respected, that is to say, being left alone to sit elegantly dressed in her bejeweled headdress, and look silently out into the courtyard. She liked being surrounded by heavy silence. Silence was the luxurious privilege of the happy few who could afford to keep the children away.

Finally, on the right side of the courtyard was the largest and most elegant salon of all -- the men’s dining room, where they ate, listened to the news, settled business deals, and played cards. The men were the only ones in the house supposed to have access to a huge cabinet radio which they kept in the right corner of their salon, with the cabinet doors locked when the radio was not in use. (Loudspeakers were installed outside, however, to allow everyone to listen to it.) Father was sure that he and Uncle had the only two keys to the radio. However, curiously enough, the women managed to listen to Radio Cairo regularly, when the men were out. Chama and Mother often would be dancing away to its
tunes, singing along with the Lebanese princess Asmahan "Ahwa" (I am in love), with no men in sight. And I remember quite clearly the first time the grownups used the word khain (traitors) to describe Samir and myself: when we told Father, who had asked us what we had done while he was away, that we had listened to Radio Cairo. Our answer indicated that there was an unlawful key going around. More specifically, it indicated that the women had

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stolen the key and made a copy of it. "If they made a copy of the radio key, soon they'll make one to open the gate," growled Father. A huge dispute ensued, with the women being interviewed in the men's salon one at a time. But after two days of inquiry, it turned out that the radio key must have fallen from the sky. No one knew where it had come from. Even so, following the inquiry, the women took their revenge on us children. They said that we were traitors, and ought to be excluded from their games. That was a horrifying prospect, and so we defended ourselves by explaining that all we had done was tell the truth. Mother retorted by saying that some things were true, indeed, but you still could not say them: you had to keep them secret. And then she added that what you say and what you keep secret has nothing to do with truth and lies. We begged her to explain to us how to tell the difference, but she did not come up with a helpful answer. "You have to judge by yourselves the impact of your words," she said. "If what you say could hurt someone, then you keep quiet." Well, that advice did not help us at all. Poor Samir hated being called a traitor. He rebelled and shouted that he was free to say whatever he wanted. I, as usual, admired his audacity, but kept silent. I decided that if, on top of trying to distinguish truth from lies (which was already giving me a lot of trouble), I also had to distinguish this new category of "secret," I was headed for a lot of confusion, and I would just have to accept the fact that I often would be insulted and called a traitor.

One of my weekly pleasures was to admire Samir as he staged his mutinies against the grownups, and I felt that if I only kept following him, nothing bad could happen to me. Samir and I were born the same day, in a long Ramadan afternoon, with hardly one hour's difference.\footnote{\textit{Ramadan}, the sacred ninth month of the Muslim calendar, is observed by daily fasting from sunrise to sunset.} He came first, born

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on the second floor, the seventh child of his mother. I was born one hour later in our salon downstairs, my parents' firstborn, and although Mother was exhausted, she insisted that my aunts and relatives hold the same celebration rituals for me as for Samir. She had always rejected male superiority as nonsense and totally anti-Muslim -- "Allah made us all equal," she would say. The house, she later recalled, vibrated for a second time that afternoon, with the traditional \textit{you-you-you- you} and festive chants, and the neighbors got confused and thought that two baby boys had been born. Father was thrilled: I was very plump with a round face "like a moon," and he immediately decided that I was going to be a great beauty. To tease him a little, Lalla Mani told him that I was a bit too pale,
and my eyes were too slanted, and my cheekbones too high, while Samir, she said, had "a beautiful golden tan and the largest black velvet eyes you ever saw." Mother told me later that she kept quiet, but as soon as she could stand on her feet, she rushed to see if Samir really had velvet eyes, and he did. He still does, but all the velvety softness disappears when he is in his seditious moods, and I have always wondered whether his inclination to jump up and down when rebelling against the grownups was not merely due to his wiry build.

In contrast, I was so plump then that it never occurred to me to leap when someone annoyed me; I just cried and ran to hide in my mother's caftan. But Mother kept saying that I could not rely on Samir to do all the rebelling for me: "You have to learn to scream and protest, just the way you learned to walk and talk. Crying when you are insulted is like asking for more." She was so worried that I would grow up to be an obsequious woman that she consulted Grandmother Yasmina, known to be incomparable at staging confrontations, when

2You-you-you-you is a joyous song women chant to celebrate happy events, from birth and marriage to simple ones, such as finishing an embroidery piece, or organizing a party for an old aunt.

visiting her on summer vacations. Grandmother advised her to stop comparing me with Samir, and to push me instead to develop a protective attitude toward the younger children. "There are many ways to create a strong personality," she said. "One of them is to develop the capacity to feel responsible for others. Simply being aggressive, and jumping at your neighbor's throat whenever he or she makes a blunder is one way, and surely not the most elegant one. Pushing a child to feel responsible for the younger ones in the courtyard gives her room to build strength. Hanging on to Samir for protection could be okay, but if she figures out how to protect others, she can use that skill for herself."

But it was the radio incident that taught me an important lesson. It was then that Mother told me about the need to chew my words before letting them out. "Turn each word around your tongue seven times, with your lips tightly shut, before uttering a sentence," she said. "Because once your words are out, you might lose a lot." Then I remembered how, in one of the tales from A Thousand and One Nights, a single misspoken word could bring disaster to the unfortunate one who had pronounced it and displeased the caliph, or king. Sometimes, the siāf, or executioner, would even be called in.

However, words could save the person who knew how to string them artfully together. That is what happened to Scheherazade, the author of the thousand and one tales. The king was about to chop off her head, but she was able to stop him at the last minute, just by using words. I was eager to find out how she had done it.
ABSTRACT

On account of the ground-breaking events ranging from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the announcement of the “end of history”, through the engulfing trend of globalization that ensued, to the theory of the Clash of Civilizations and its neo-conservative proponents in the 90s --vindicated among other things, some might argue, by the cataclysmic attacks of New York in 2001-- this paper explores broadly, given the urgency of the events, how the Arab-Muslim world is witnessing a pace of political, economic, and cultural changes during these last thirty years never seen before, culminating ultimately in what is known now as the “Arab Spring” and a complete reshuffle of the MENA region.

These changes have been affecting a lot of aspects of our lives, and ultimately our identities and the way we relate, we exchange and we interact with the rest of the world as Arabs and Muslims.

Special emphasis is put on the case of Morocco since this country stands out, given its “resilience” to change, preferring stability and homeopathic doses to radical change.

Key Words: Identity, culture, nations, Arab Spring, religion, Islam, history, September 11th.

« Quand une fois la liberté a explosé dans une âme d’homme, les dieux ne peuvent plus rien contre cet homme-là »

(Jean-Paul Sartre, Les Mouches).

INTRODUCTION

The Arab world is in turmoil, statues are crashing to earth. The optimists speak of an Arab spring, an Arab revolution; the conspiracy theory holders speak of a hidden agenda manipulated by imperialist forces so as to have free access to Arab land and resources. The pessimists finally believe that the revolution is genuine, but its outcome will result only in worse conditions and chaos.

But beyond these basic assumptions, our role and aim as Arab and Muslim intellectuals and scholars are to analyse and gauge these generalisations in order to put them in perspective, decipher the rationale, if any, behind the irruption of these

uprisings that seemingly no one expected including think-tank groups and geopolitical analysts.

We believe that what is at stake is huge enough to prompt a serious reconsideration of our beliefs, ideologies, etc. It is a rebirth and a paradigm shift that put in question our founding myths, our identities as Arabs, Muslims, our notions of nation, country, state, “Umma”.

Indeed, not one single country in the Arab world has been spared from the winds of change that are blowing on the whole region. The movement is so abrupt and quick that no one seems to be able to hold it or refrain it. Why at this very moment? Is the West’s “surprise” genuine, or is it simply another Frankenstein that has escaped the leash? The French historian Alain Garrigou, in an article in *Le monde diplomatique* entitled “1948, le printemps des peuples,” draws an interesting parallel between what is going on in the Arab world and what happened in 1848 in Europe.\(^{18}\)

Before going further, I’d like to shed light on what some might consider as polemical aspects of the title of my paper. First, the word Arab is problematic in a country like Morocco where half of its population is not Arab, where a minority goes further and considers the Arabs as invaders. The word Muslim again is problematic: does it refer to the person born from Muslim parents but who might not know much about his/her religion or its rituals, or shall we consider a Muslim only the one who prays, fasts, and observes the five pillars of Islam? In this case we will exclude about half of the Moroccan population as being non-Muslim. In other words, and far from being limited to its religious dimension, the word Muslim seems more and more amalgamated with social and/or ethnic identities.\(^{19}\)

Identity is precisely the word to stop at to decipher since, first, it is one of the key words of this essay, and since it is such a complex and polysemous term. So, which

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\(^{18}\) *Le MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE*, May, 2011. Alain Garigou details how Europe’s “spring” started with a “simple” incident at the gates of the French monarchy’s palace in Paris, and how the French prime minister at the time ordered the royal guard to fire against the insurgents. This ended with the insurgents radicalizing their movement and ultimately propagating it to the rest of Europe. Some years later, and fearing the repercussions of the movement on their own existence, the European monarchies united in a counter-revolutionary movement that crashed the European “spring.” With the unison of the Gulf monarchies against the insurgents in their respective countries and in the region as a whole, we have the right to ask if what is going on now in Bahrein, UAE, Saoudi Arabia is not a remake of that old story.

\(^{19}\) This seems to be also the case of the word “Jew.”
identity are we referring to? the social, the political, the economic, the ethnic, the racial, or all these together?²⁰

The legitimacy of these questions lies in the fact that these identifications—questions remain what Limame Barbouchi calls “mere articulations,”²¹ especially at a time when identity has become transient in a world that has been reduced to a “mere village,” wherein different cultures get into direct contact and interaction resulting in the emergence of new identities, or to use a more “fashionable” word, dear to the postmodernists, “hybrid identities.”

Indeed, the study of identity has triggered in different fields of academia and scholarship a remarkable debate that has led to question concepts such as nation, state, culture, etc. --concepts that sometimes pose also some difficulties of translation into Arabic.²²

For example what makes the world define the phenomenon taking place nowadays in this region as “the Arab spring?” Is it a question of concomitant borders, but borders, as we all know, are artificial and were most of the time imposed by the former colonising western powers. There are nations without borders and borders without coherent nations.²³ Or is the Arab spring due to the fact that a majority of the inhabitants of this region speak Arabic, or because of the historic background of this region, or simply because the regimes of this region happen to be all autocratic with a long history of oppression and denial of human rights for their people?

What I am endeavouring to convey is simply that notions that we might take for granted could prove to be very complex and misleading. This is worth our introspection because what you can hear, read, or see sometimes among the protesting Moroccan movements, part of the awakening taking place in the Arab world, is just full of confusion and mistakes. But perhaps the most original and even “dangerous” aspect of these movements, another might say, is their self-proclaimed righteousness and the refusal to accept any dissonant opinion.

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²⁰ The Oxford dictionary defines identity as “distinguishing features” and “determining characteristics”. The former may include a person’s name, photo or signature, whereas the latter may include aspects of gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion and so on.
²² Barbouchi corroborates further by saying that in addressing this issue of identity, “one will recognize that what people say about their identities is a mere articulation; it is an articulation that is filtered through language to give us a sense of belongingness and thus a sense of Being.” Ibid, p. 75
²³ We think here of the Kurds, the native Americans, the Amazigh, the former states of the USSR or of Yugoslavia.
Indeed, the “20 Fevrier” Movement militants belong to different factions that are in utter opposition when it comes to their ideologies/identities, from ultra-Marxist-Leninists to ultra-religious, all walking together in public marches and demonstrations, claiming a refusal of tyranny and injustice, but conspicuously contradictory about the ultimate society they aim to achieve.

This polarisation is reflected even in the intellectual circles that try to defend respectively the “chapel”/group they represent. Here is for example an interesting interview with Tariq Ramadan and Abdelwahab Meddeb in *Le Monde* entitled « De la charia à l'islamophobie, de l'homosexualité au statut de la femme, » held in April 2011, and how each one of these two Arab intellectuals holds quite opposing positions as to what defines the identities of the youngsters who protested in the “Arab Spring.” While Ramadan acknowledges that the movement is certainly not *Islamist*, he rightfully condemns those who claim it to be *anti-Islamic*. On the other hand, A. Meddeb openly rejects any religious dimension of the movement and defines it rather as a humanist movement. He maintains that it is not post-Islamic but beyond Islam:

> ... c'est ainsi que je qualifierai ce qui s'est passé en Tunisie et en Egypte. La question du référent religieux ne s'est pas posée. Ces événements n'ont rien à voir avec l'identité religieuse ou culturelle. Les gens se sont révoltés contre une situation où l'habeas corpus n'était pas respecté. Le minimum de l’intégrité de l'individu n’était pas assuré. Ce soulèvement s'est fait au-delà des identités. Ce n'est pas parce qu'on est musulman qu'on proteste mais en tant qu'opprimé. La protestation s'est exprimée au nom de l'humanité bafouée. Dès qu'on évoque l’espace du sud, on a le prurit du référent qui engendre la différence. C'est d'ailleurs un réflexe occidental que de voir quelque chose d’islamique dans tout événement qui provient des territoires dont la religion dominante est l’islam. Seule a été invoquée la liberté comme principe qui appartient à l’homme, au droit naturel. Certes la culture et la religion de ces pays n’ont pas entravé cet appel à la liberté. Aussi ces mouvements n’étaient ni islamistes, ni islamiques. Ceux qui se sont soulèvés ont réclamé leur autonomie d’individu et le droit qu’ils ont sur leur pays, cela même qui leur était refusé par les prédateurs qui les dirigeaient. Ceux qui ont eu l'audace de manifester en affrontant la mort défendaient et réclamaient une même chose : être un homme libre. Ces Arabes auraient pu être des Chinois ou des Birmans. Leur seul référent était le droit à la liberté, à la dignité, à la justice que tout humain revendique. Cela excède la dichotomie Islam/Occident.

On the other hand, this polarisation could be simply part of the normal course of any movement born in undemocratic environments with a predominance of the

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leader’s unique opinion and voice. That is why some analysts consider that in spite of these shortcomings, they consider that this is the Arab world’s exit into history, “an exit from a sterile closed place into a land of painful and consequential choices,” a shift from the status of subjects to the status of citizens.\(^{25}\)

Professor **John Keane**, from the University of Sidney, is among the analysts who consider the Arab awakening as a unique movement for which there is a need to coin a new word: “refolution” instead of revolution. He argues that:

> A new word is needed to describe these remarkable events of recent months. They can be called ‘refolutions’, radical refusals of the old choice between reform and revolution and the familiar revolutionary logic of using violence to capture and dismantle the imagined heartlands of state power.\(^{26}\)

It should be said, however, that the transformations that have begun in the Arab world in recent months are admittedly still in their infancy. Nobody knows what will happen next; only a divinity could predict with certainty what the near-distant future holds. That, of course, is the trademark of revolutions: “they unchain struggles for freedom and power manoeuvres that inject great uncertainty into the world.”\(^{27}\)

**I. Islam and the Arab Spring.**

The Arab uprising has created, among other phenomena, a paradigm shift at the level of religion. **Arshin Adib-Moghaddam** considers that the emancipatory movements in the Arab world represent an inner shift in the self-understanding of Islam - one that promises to overcome an era of false polarities and dogmas.\(^{28}\) A lot of scholars are speaking now about a “postmodern Islam,” a radical departure from the deterministic, totalitarian “Islamism” of previous generations. One has only to review what some Islamists used to say about “democracy” --as being the invention of the West in order to trick Muslims into abandoning their political system based

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\(^{25}\) This could be corroborated through the example of Israel, a very young state made of ultra religious and ultra-liberal groups of different, and often very distant origins, but which still form one of the rare “democratic” countries in the region, at least from the perspective of the Western countries; since we Arab-Muslims consider it rather a racist and segregationist state in its dealing with its Arab-Israeli citizens.

\(^{26}\) “Refolution in the Arab World,” 28 April 2011. ([www.opendemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net))

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) “Post modern Islam and the Arab revolts” 7 March 2011 ([www.opendemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net))
on “Shura”-- and how they all now accept the term as relevant and suitable for an equitable and just society.

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam then goes on to insist on the postmodern Islam which floats freely on the world-wide-web, and links it up with the universal move towards democracy, social equality and resistance to political tyranny.

Even at the level of discourse, the moderate Islamists have adopted a new one and do not necessarily consider using French as a sign of alienation (I am thinking here of our new prime minister, A. Benkirane, and his “original” communication for a Moroccan Premier, a mixture of Arabic-classical and dialect- and French, ). In this emerging discourse, prescriptions such as “Islam is...” and “Islam must be...” are succeeded by formulations such as “Islam may add...” and “Islam could be...”. This is a profound shift, one that is discernible in many speeches of the leaders of the “Ikhwan brotherhood” in Egypt and the Al-Nahda party in Tunisia and the PJD Party in Morocco.

II. Arab Muslim Identity after 9/11

After the 9/11 events, the Madrid and London attacks, the election, twice, of a neoconservative president and team at the head of the most powerful country in the world, after the zeal and violent reaction of Muslim masses to the publication of denigrating caricatures of the prophet Mohamed by a Danish cartoonist, the turmoil over the place of Islam vs secularism in the West, and the trivialisation of certain words and concepts like crusades, clash of civilisations, fundamentalism, islamophobia, etc., many people think that the prophesy of the French intellectual André Malraux, “the 21st C. will be spiritual of will not,” has proven right.

Indeed, numerous elements could have blatantly proven the veracity of this thesis if it were not for the Arab Spring that has put into question the whole theory. Never has human history gone as wild as it has during these first years of the 21st Century’s second decade. The uprisings, the protests, the revolts, the revolution that is taking place in the Arab world is unprecedented, and what’s more, it is an “Allahou Akbar free” revolution, at least in the case of Tunisia and Egypt before the collapse of the two regimes; while in Morocco, the unofficial Islamist “Al Adl oual Ihssan” party has kept a low profile in the street protests led by “The February 20th” Movement.

Given the influence and impacts the Arab uprising are having worldwide, including countries as powerful as France, Spain and China yesterday, and Russia and the US
today, it might be more appropriate to rectify Malraux’s quote into: “the 21\textsuperscript{st} C. will be \textit{revolutionary} or will be not.”

Theorists and often partisans who tried pseudo-scientifically to prove that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy, and that Arabs “naturally” accept their leaders’ violence and oppression because it is an integral part of their culture, (Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz…) have seen their theory shattered by this uprising...

Of course these theorists might retort, “don’t get too excited, this is just the beginning, the worst is yet to come, and it’s going to be worst than the theocratic Iranian regime,” our answer is simply and humbly, the aftermath is unknown, but without doubt, it will be anything except a hardline religious regime à l’Iranienne because of globalisation, the digital revolution and social networking, the latter which has proven to be the most populous, powerful and influential cyber country in the world with more than a billion and a half people subscribing to social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube.

Indeed, this leads us to talk about this other significant illustration of the Arab Muslim Identity change seen at the level of how New Technologies and Communication (NTC) as well as globalisation have completely integrated the Arab Muslim citizen within the postmodern world. But perhaps more significant, how these phenomena have revolutionized the leader-citizen relationship in this part of the world. The case of the former Libyan dictator is a case in point. Having always been out of History, he could not foresee the great tide of change that had already swept away two of his former colleagues. He simply turned mad, both figuratively and literally. Figuratively against the “ungrateful” Libyans, and especially at the idea that he, the king of Kings, the most senior Arab leader, the founder of the Great Jamahiria and author of the “unparalleled Green Book,” is challenged by some “rats, cockroaches and drug-addicts,” meaning those who dared revolt against him.

Gaddafi could not understand the Tunisians for whom, he had publicly declared, he felt pity because they were unable to realize the “blunder” they were committing by dismissing their “good and genius” leader Ben Ali. Some days later, he reiterated the same attitude towards the “unconscious” Egyptian people for overthrowing president Husni Mubarak.

If he never expressed any sympathy or any remorse towards his own population -- that he was indeed ready to massacre had he not been stopped by Nato,-- there is
but one explanation to this attitude: this man did not realise the world has changed, and that the digital revolution and globalisation have heralded a radical change for humanity; in other words and once again, this man was simply living outside history... (Bachar El Assad of Syria is another notorious example)

Conclusion

In our current world, we are more and more prompted to identify and question our beliefs and assumptions as well as their “universality.” Arab and Muslim intellectuals are defending sometimes quite opposing positions in their analysis of what defines this movement known as the Arab Spring. While some claim it is an “Allaho Akbar” free movement, and detach it from any religious referent, most claim it to be a movement born within an Islamic soil not in contradiction with the Islamic version of democracy and freedom.

Anyway, and as I wrote in a previous essay:

*Muslims in general and Arabs in particular are on the front line. Known for their conservatism and emphasis on tradition, they are being stigmatized day in day out. The alarming proportions of islamophobia are just unprecedented and the economic downturn since 2008 is making things far worse. What is more is the fact that this might be just the beginning. If things do not brighten up, and Heaven forbid, this economic recession lingers on for some more years, I shudder at the gloomy prospects awaiting us and especially awaiting the large Muslim Diaspora living in majority Christian countries.*

The recent events of the so called “Arab Spring”, and above all the digital revolution and its repercussions on our identities and lives, are some of the new elements and challenges that every analyst, scholar, or simply Arab Muslim citizen has to reckon with if he or she is to understand the mechanisms shaping the world after 9/11.

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